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Actual Agreement, Shared Meaning
Analysis, and the Invalidation of Boilerplate:
A Response to Professors Kar and Radin
Steven W. Feldman*
“While new commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many new situations, it has not fundamentally changed the principles of contract.”1

ABSTRACT
In their February 2019 article in the Harvard Law Review, Pseudo-Contract And Shared Meaning Analysis, Professors Robin Bradley Kar and Margaret Jane Radin argued that, notwithstanding its physical presence in the document (or on a computer screen), boilerplate without actual agreement lacks
contractual force.
The authors advocated the technique of shared meaning analysis as a solution to the challenges presented by boilerplate contracts. By referring to
“shared meaning,” Kar and Radin proposed that courts enforce “[t]he meaning that parties produce and agree to during contract formation that is most
consistent with the presupposition that both were using language cooperatively
to form a contract.”
I recommend that courts and legislatures reject shared meaning analysis.
The likely practical ramifications of this empirically untested proposal – which
is designed to delete numerous boilerplate contract terms – would be the roiling of markets by precluding buyers and sellers from maintaining confidence
in their agreements. The current system provides more effective measures to
safeguard private ordering.

* Of Counsel, Lanier Ford Shaver & Payne, Huntsville, Alabama. J.D., Vanderbilt University. Thanks to Rob Kar, David Horton and Jeff Lipshaw for their incisive comments on earlier drafts. Special thanks to my wife, Gayla Feldman, for her love and
support. Kudos to the staff members of the Missouri Law Review for their outstanding
editorial support.
1. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004).
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INTRODUCTION

Analyzing a difficult subject that “pervades” contract law and that is “vital” to the national economy,2 scholars have produced scores of articles about
the legal and societal aspects of boilerplate contract terms.3 Professors Robin
Bradley Kar and Margaret Jane Radin contributed to the conversation with their
February 2019 article in the Harvard Law Review, Pseudo-Contract And
Shared Meaning Analysis.4 The authors argued that, notwithstanding its physical presence in the document (or on a computer screen),5 boilerplate without
actual agreement lacks contractual force.6 The authors claimed that the widespread use of pseudo-contracts and their “fake terms” invited “burgeoning
forms of [consumer] deception.”7 To Kar and Radin, the prevalence of boilerplate has so undermined mutual assent that it has jeopardized the legitimacy of
contract itself.8
The authors advocated the technique of shared meaning analysis as a solution to the challenges presented by boilerplate contracts. By referring to
“shared meaning,” Kar and Radin proposed that courts enforce ”[t]he meaning

2. See, e.g., Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism, The
Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 26, 27 (2012)
(“There is little doubt that the treatment of standard contracts is one of the most important puzzles facing modern contract law – and perhaps one of the most difficult.”
Also stating that “Standard form contracts pervade the consumer arena” and that they
are “vital to the continued functioning of the economy.”); Eyal Zamir, Contract Law
and Theory: Three Views of the Cathedral, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 2077, 2096 (2014) (“Few
topics in recent decades have attracted more attention in contract scholarship than
standard-form contracts, and rightly so.” Also stating, “there is hardly a more pressing
challenge facing contract law.”).
3. The articles addressing standard form contracts are legion and date back more
than 100 years. See, e.g. Randy E. Barnett, Consenting to Form Contracts, 71
FORDHAM L. REV. 627 (2002); Nathan Isaacs, The Standardizing of Contracts, 27 Yale
L.J. 34 (1917); Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion–Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983); W. David Slawson,
Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 529 (1971).
4. 132 HARV. L. REV. 1135 (2019). Robin Bradley Kar is Professor of Law and
Philosophy at the University of Illinois. Margaret Jane Radin is Professor of Law at
the University of Toronto and Professor of Law Emerita at both Stanford University
and the University of Michigan.
5. Id. at 1138.
6. Id. at 1139–40.
7. Id. at 1140.
8. “We define ‘boilerplate text’ as any preformatted text that is provided to
multiple parties or on multiple occasions or both during contract formation.” Id. at
1219 n.8.
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that parties produce and agree to during contract formation that is most consistent with the presupposition that both were using language cooperatively to form a contract.”9 The authors’ legal theory for addressing unenforceable boilerplate was not reformation, where the moving party seeks a contract adjustment to ameliorate a mistake or fraud,10 nor was it severance, where
a party seeks to remove illegal terms – such as those that offend public policy.11
Instead, the authors contended that much boilerplate should be judicially excised from the contract because it is usually outside the bounds of the parties’
actual agreement.12
The authors declared that shared meaning analysis has a strong foundation
in the traditional principles of contract interpretation, but that it also operates
in a more refined way.13 Kar and Radin believe that their “[d]efinition of
shared meaning captures the most important considerations that have guided
courts and helped them to discern the common meaning of the parties for centuries . . .”14 In the authors’ opinion, linguistics has much to offer in solving
difficult matters of contract interpretation.15 Kar and Radin argued, “Contract
. . . has in many instances become pseudo-contract – a system of private obligations with expanding contents that are created unilaterally by one party.” 16
Thus, the authors urged courts to adopt shared meaning analysis in place of the
current judicial norms of contractual interpretation.17
I respectfully suggest that Kar and Radin’s article is doctrinally and normatively unpersuasive,18 most notably regarding its suggested approach to the

9. Id. at 1143, 1146, 1160, 1167, 1216 (adding qualification that the presupposition holds “even if one party was not acting fully cooperatively so long as the
presupposition was warranted.”).
10. CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 440–41 (2011) (explaining reformation).
11. 1 SAMUEL L. WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §
19:70 (4th ed. 2019) (explaining severance).
12. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1166–68.
13. Id. at 1166.
14. Id. at 1143 (emphasis added).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1140.
17. Id. at 1215 (“Shared meaning analysis . . . is grounded in core contract law
principles and has sufficient scope and flexibility to solve many of the problems highlighted in this Article.”).
18. In various ways, Kar and Radin rely on Professor Radin’s book, BOILERPLATE:
THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW (2014). For my critique of
this book, which carries over in relevant part to the authors’ present article, especially
Part IX, see Steven W. Feldman, Mutual Assent, Normative Degradation, and Mass
Market Standard Form Contracts—A Two-Part Critique of Boilerplate: The Fine Print,
Vanishing Rights and the Rule of Law (Part I), 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373 (2014).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss3/7

4

Feldman: Actual Agreement, Shared Meaning Analysis, and the Invalidation o

2019]

BOILERPLATE INVALIDATION

715

use of linguistics.19 Because the authors have made a largely doctrinal argument in support of shared meaning analysis, I have made a largely doctrinal
response opposing the validity of their reform.20 Their proposal raises many
other concerns as discussed below.
While no thoughtful proposal on contract doctrine should be rejected out
of hand, my chief concern is any new approach must be rooted in the fundamental doctrines of contract law to have a fair chance of adoption. As will be
shown, the traditional principles of contract as consistently implemented by the
great majority of courts lend no support for the authors’ suggestion that the law
for “centuries” has comported with actual agreement and shared meaning analysis.21
The authors’ proposed concept also clashes with the essential precepts of
contract including the objective standard of contract, freedom of contract, and
the duty to read and understand a contract. The likely practical ramifications
of this empirically untested proposal – which is designed to delete numerous
boilerplate contract terms – would be the roiling of markets by precluding buyers and sellers from maintaining confidence in their agreements. The inevitable
consequence of Kar and Radin’s sea change would be to undermine the two
goals of contract, which are first, enforcing the contract accepted by the parties
and second, ensuring the stability, certainty, and predictability of contract. For
all these reasons, I recommend that courts and legislatures reject shared meaning analysis. The current system provides more effective measures in safeguarding private ordering.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II summarizes the authors’ extensive and detailed argument. Part III disputes Kar and Radin’s reliance on linguistics as a valid aid to contract interpretation. Part IV discusses the authors’
definition and classification of standardized contracts and explains the benefits
and detriments for the commercial system. Part V addresses whether contract
law has kept pace with twenty first century communications technology. Part
VI considers the authors’ argument about the centrality of “actual agreement”
and “shared meaning analysis” for contract interpretation. This Part is the heart
of the Article and covers the goals and components of shared meaning analysis:
cooperation and good faith during contract formation; the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the “common meaning” of the parties; the courts and
“common meaning” of the parties; the competing standards of mutual assent;
the objective and subjective theories; how much sharing is needed for shared
19. Kar and Radin are not saying basic contract law should be different based on
shared meaning analysis. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1215. Rather, they are contending that shared meaning analysis comports with the first principles of contract interpretation, but that courts and theorists have departed from its premises. Id. (arguing
that “assimilationist” approaches “reduce” and even “eviscerat[e] the traditional requirement of actual agreement.”). This Article will show the converse is true about
which position is undermining the first principles of contract interpretation.
20. The authors assert that their proposal “raises a complex blend of linguistic,
factual, conceptual, normative and doctrinal problems.” Id. at 1137.
21. Id. at 1140, 1143.
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meaning; and the ramifications of shared meaning analysis. Part VII covers
shared meaning analysis and freedom of contract. Part VIII considers shared
meaning analysis and a party’s duty to read a contract. Part IX addresses the
precedents challenging the use of boilerplate in contrast to the majority view.
Based on the first principles of contract formation and interpretation, the majority view better reconciles the conflicting precedents in favor of the current
system.

I. OVERVIEW OF “PSEUDO-CONTRACT AND SHARED MEANING
ANALYSIS”
A detailed overview of Kar and Radin’s eighty-five-page article will aid
the discussion. Subtopics in this part include: Pseudo Contract and the Assimilationists, Shared Meaning Analysis, The Authors and Neo-Gricean Linguistics, and The Aims of Shared Meaning Analysis.

A. Pseudo-Contract and the Assimilationists
Kar and Radin first argued that an incremental but relentless “paradigm
slip” has occurred where the widespread use of boilerplate over the last few
decades has adversely transformed the nature of contracting.22 The authors
contended that, in terms of sufficiency to bind consumers, contract law has
inappropriately moved from consent to assent, then from assent to fictive/hypothetical assent, and lastly from hypothetical assent to the purchaser’s fictional or constructive notice.23
Kar and Radin argued, “Lacking any sound reason to replace contract, we
must seek better methods of evaluating boilerplate text so as to bring contract
law back into coherence with its core concepts, principles, and justifications.”24
The result of this doctrinal tipping point is “pseudo-contract” – an oppressive
regime of boilerplate with only limited defenses to enforcement, such as unconscionability, duress, and illegality.25 Otherwise, the authors argued that
sellers have free rein to impose upon consumers highly detailed and heavily
one-sided contract terms.26 Indeed, Kar and Radin emphasized that the seller
fully knows and expects that the typical consumer will sign (or click) without

22. Id. at 1137.
23. Id. at 1139–40.
24. Id. at 1142.
25. Id.
26. Kar and Radin assert that shared meaning analysis applies to all contracts. Id.
at 1182. Because the authors devote most of their attention to consumer contracts, this
Article will do the same.
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reading the copious terms or having a subjective understanding of the transaction.27
Kar and Radin believe pseudo-contract distorts core contract law concepts, such as “assent,” “agreement,” and “interpretation.”28 This distortion
now allows businesses to create legal obligations unilaterally without obtaining
any actual agreement over many boilerplate terms.29 While the authors
acknowledged that “Boilerplate is not necessarily pseudo-contract,” they still
maintained that “ [ a] great deal of contemporary boilerplate text has become
pseudo-contractual.”30
The authors heavily criticized “assimilationist” courts and commentators
whom they accused of defending the status quo on boilerplate and mutual assent.31 The major problem with assimilationists, the authors claimed, is that
they hold fast to nineteenth century contract doctrine in adjudicating the enforceability of the twenty first century’s new mode: digital contracts.32 As a
result, the authors argued assimilationist theory has failed from both a “linguistic and normative point of view” because the law has yet to recognize the full
depths of how much the “changes in technology” changed how people communicate.33 In a recurring theme, Kar and Radin argued that the slow, incremental transformation of contract into fake contracts – called a “paradigm slip”

27. Id. at 1196 (“businesses now have incentives to make use of extensive pseudocontractual text to take advantage of consumers’ rationality in not reading an overwhelming amount of boilerplate text”) (emphasis omitted).
28. Id. at 1214.
29. Id. at 1137. Although Kar and Radin are correct that merchants commonly
draft the terms unilaterally, the contracts are formed bilaterally because the parties
make reciprocal promises, i.e., payment of money for services rendered or goods delivered. See Bilateral Contract, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
30. Id. at 1137–38 (asserting high-end boilerplate contracts between sophisticated
parties are frequently contractual but the opposite conclusion applies to unread and unreadable boilerplate in consumer transactions).
31. “We define as ‘assimilationist’ as any court or theorist who treats all boilerplate as part of a ‘contract’ so long as it is delivered with actual or merely constructive
‘notice’ to a party who agrees to a more basic transaction.’” Id. at 1139.
32. “[T]echnological changes [are] transforming the uses of digital and written
text and methods of communication in ways that [ are] novel enough, and complex
enough, that many courts [ a r e ] left without a c l e a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f how
best to extend traditional contract law concepts and principles to these rapidly
evolving settings.” Id. at 1173.
33. Id. at 1144; see also id. at 1140 (“The fake ‘terms’ in a regime of pseudocontract invite burgeoning forms of deception that are difficult for courts to discern
because they are hidden under the mantle of “contract.”).
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– has further facilitated a “fundamental break” from centuries of case law
requiring contracts to be “significantly” grounded in “actual agreement.”35
34

B. Shared Meaning Analysis
By referring to a “shared meaning,” Kar and Radin advocated that courts
enforce “[t]he meaning that parties produce and agree to during contract formation that is most consistent with the presupposition that both were using
language cooperatively to form a contract.”36 According to Kar and Radin,
their adaptation of “shared meaning analysis” is “consistent with long-standing
approaches.”37 Thus, the authors contended that their formulation re-establishes the essence of contract such that the courts need to disregard all the nonconsensual boilerplate found in modern contracts, except where the parties
have reached actual agreement on specific boilerplate terms.38
The authors also argued that absent actual agreement that was freely
reached, enforcing these pseudo-contracts violates the weaker party’s freedom
of contract.39 In Kar and Radin’s proposal, “freedom of contract” contemplates
parties with equal capacities where the parties expect they will each realize
expected gain.40 Parties have this freedom only where they are able to safely
trust that a “well-functioning legal system” will focus legal enforcement on
“ shared agreements.”41 These circumstances are said to be lacking in the modern contracting system, and the result is the purchaser’s loss of liberty in contracting.42
Kar and Radin called the non-consensual boilerplate that accompanies the
actual agreement “ride along” terms.43 The authors contended that such boilerplate provisions can be non-contractual even where they physically appear in
34. A “paradigm slip” in this context means that although the law strives to maintain the basic concepts of contract law, the result is a largely unintended drift, mostly
unnoticed, and a deviation from fundamental doctrinal principles. Id. at 1141–42. They
contrast this concept with a “paradigm shift” which is related to a “paradigm slip” except that in the former the proponent consciously intends a fundamental shift. Id.
35. Id. at 1142, 1143, 1169, 1173.
36. Id. at 1143, 1146, 1160, 1167, 1216 (adding qualification that the presupposition holds “even if one party was not acting fully cooperatively so long as the
presupposition was warranted.”).
37. Id. at 1143.
38. Id. at 1213.
39. Id. at 1161.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 1125
43. Id. at 1207, 1209. Boilerplate has contractual status only when it contributes
shared meaning to the contract or the actual agreement. Id. at 1143. With online contracts, the parties can still clearly desire to form a contract and reach an actual agreement – but Kar and Radin say that the pact does not necessarily include copious pages
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the contract’s terms and conditions.44 Accordingly, Kar and Radin believe
terms that are merely informational and absent from the offer/acceptance process are within this ride-along category and cannot be used against the consumer. 45
The authors were aware much boilerplate goes unread by the consumer,
and this fact provided the impetus for their thesis.46 Where the purchaser neither reads the term nor approves it as part of contract formation, the authors
posited these terms should never be deemed part of the actual agreement.47
Thus, “contract meaning” depends on linguistic cooperation – often in ways
that are “[s] ubtle and difficult to recognize.”48

C. The Authors and Neo-Gricean Linguistics
To lend additional appeal for their reform and to convince courts that
shared meaning analysis has doctrinal and normative superiority to assimilationist approaches, the authors relied on the philosophy of language as expounded by the linguist Paul Grice, a pioneer in syntax and semantics.49 For
Kar and Radin, neo-Gricean linguistics is central – not tangential – to contract
interpretation.50 Grice primarily distinguished what words and sentences mean
under their dictionary definitions versus what individuals mean when they use
language to communicate in a particular context.51 However, Grice did not
seek to stamp his brand of linguistics upon contract interpretation and hence
the term, “Neo-Gricean model of shared meaning analysis,” refers to Kar and
Radin’s attempt to take Grice’s model out of context.52

of text included by hyperlink. Id. at 1210. The authors make numerous references to
contracts that have “copious” amounts of boilerplate but where used, boilerplate often
consists of just a few pages. See, e.g., Sample Timber Sale Contract, AM. FOREST
FOUND.: MY LAND PLAN, https://mylandplan.org/content/sample-timber-sale-contract
[perma.cc/V4QB-FF9Y] (timber sale contract) (last visited June 29, 2019).
44. Kar and Radin, supra note 4, at 1194.
45. Id. at 1163.
46. Id. at 1198.
47. Id. at 1174.
48. Id. at 1156.
49. Id. at 1142.
50. Id. at 1144–45.
51. A good illustration of speaker meaning versus sentence meaning would be
where a law professor states in writing a letter of recommendation for a third-year student seeking a judicial clerkship, “I support John Doe’s application for a clerkship in
your chambers. He has perfect class attendance and presents a well-groomed appearance.” The reference’s reliance on irrelevant considerations and the absence of reliance
on the expected issues of John Doe’s command of legal scholarship and general legal
ability send an implied message that the law professor has little confidence in John
Doe’s candidacy. See id. at 1147 (offering a similar example).
52. Id. at 1145–46.
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Grice also postulated the existence of conversational implicatures. These
devices illustrate the distinction between what a speaker says and what he implies in light of the circumstances surrounding the communication.53 These
“implicatures” occur where the parties implicitly pre-suppose and rely upon
cooperative norms that govern interpersonal exchanges.54 The Gricean construct emphasizes that language properly understood exists in a social and interpersonal context as opposed to an abstract setting.55
Building upon Gricean doctrine, Kar and Radin argued that a mode of
contract interpretation will be inferior when it considers only sentence meaning and logic but omits the more complex ways in which individuals naturally rely on the cooperative norms of language to communicate meaning.56
While conceding assimilationist doctrine’s “growing influence”57 in resolving
contract interpretation issues, the authors decried its alleged linguistic indeterminacy and absence of linguistic cooperation, which they said precluded
effective communication.58 Thus, the authors put forth their proposal for
shared meaning analysis – which they indicated endorses neither the objective
nor the subjective theory of contractual obligation and interpretation. 59
“Shared meaning” of a contract occurs when parties produce and actually agree to terms during contract formation based on the pre-supposition that
parties speak in social contexts using language cooperatively – as found in various norms – to form a contract.60 Kar and Radin suggested that the “parties
cannot both use language cooperatively to agree to enter into a contract and
53. Id. at 1148.
54. Gricean implicatures stem from the “cooperative principle,” which governs
where the speaker makes his conversational contribution by the accepted purpose or
direction of the talk exchange in which he is engaged. Id. at 1148. The cooperative
principle in turn forms the basis of the various maxims or norms of speech engagement
between the speaker and the listener.
55. Id. at 1147, 1216.
56. Id. at 1148.
57. Id. at 1156
58. Id. at 1153–54; see also id. at 1146–48 (a primary linguistic problem with
assimilationist approaches to boilerplate – as well as other traditional tests for contract
interpretation – is that they fail to distinguish between sentence meaning, speaker
meaning, and what the authors have called the shared meaning of a contract).
59. See id. at 1143, 1194 (discussing objective/subjective theories of contractual
theories of party assent).
60. Id. at 1146. Some examples of these norms are (1) The Maxim of Manner,
which requires clarity and the avoidance of obscurity, ambiguity, undue length, and
incoherence, and (2) The Maxim of Quality, which tells parties to avoid contributions
to conversations that the speaker either believes are false or that lack adequate evidence.
Id. at 1151. These so-called “norms” do not fit the dictionary definition of being a
“general level” or “average.” See Norm, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/norm# [perma.cc/BU7H-7FN3] (last visited June 29, 2019). These
norms lack an effective enforcement mechanism and are frequently honored more in
the breach than in the observance. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1152–53.
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fail to produce an actual agreement that each is committed to playing his or
her respective part to perform in good faith.”61 The authors further claimed
that their model builds upon the “consensus ad idem” (agreement to the same
thing), which is also the legal basis for the oft-used (and misleadingly-termed)
formulation of the “meeting of the minds.”62

D. The Aims of Shared Meaning Analysis
Kar and Radin’s proposal is no mere refinement of the law in this area.
The authors’ radical plan is to revamp contract law by replacing its very foundations. The authors ask a n e w threshold question: Is any of the boilerplate
text in dispute p art of an actual agreement that the parties reached when
they used language to form a contract?63 If there is an excessive amount of
“ride along” boilerplate that raises a doubt about the sufficiency of the remaining terms of the actual agreement, no enforceable contract would arise.64

II. THE USE OF LINGUISTICS IN CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
Because linguistics occupies such an important place in Kar and Radin’s
shared meaning analysis, this Part will first focus on the broader issue of the
relevance and utility of linguistics to contractual interpretation. As will be
shown in extensive detail below, the authors’ linkage between linguistics and
contract lacks merit for several reasons. Kar and Radin also failed to cite or
otherwise dispute the views of commentators who have analyzed – and rejected
– the relation of linguistics and contract generally and the Grice/contract interpretation/intersection specifically.65
Still deeper – and again unmentioned – issues pervade Kar and Radin’s
new construct. As will be analyzed below, these issues are first, the likely
inadmissibility at trial of shared meaning analysis under the rules of evidence
and second, the authors’ reliance on linguistics reveals undue favoritism for the
consumer and little or no regard for the merchant’s valid interests.

61. Id. at 1152–53.
62. Id. at 1154, n.64. For criticisms of this usage, see 1 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
supra note 11, §§ 3:4, 3:5, 4:1, 4.3.
63. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1155.
64. Id. at 1167–68, 1192; cf. infra notes 294–95 and accompanying text (discussing the requirement for definite contracts).
65. See infra Part III.A.
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A. Linguistics and Contract Interpretation: A Controversial Relationship
Linguistics is the science of language and constitutes phonetics, phonology, morphology, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, and historical linguistics.66
“[I]n the field of corpus linguistics, scholars . . . determine . . . [either] those
meanings that are consistent with common usage,” or “the term’s ordinary or
most frequent meaning” based on empirical data rather than personal intuition.67 Regarding the utility of linguistics, the late Professor E. Allan Farnsworth of the Columbia Law School – former Reporter for the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and the author of a widely cited three-volume treatise on
contract law – noted the controversial tie between linguistics and the philosophy of language on the one hand and contract interpretation on the other hand:
Philosophers and semanticists have debated at length the proper use
of [these disciplines], if any [in relation to contract interpretation].
It is tempting to look to these discussions for help in dealing with
contract language. Most of [these discussions], however, are wide
of the mark because they concentrate on language as it is used in
science to describe experience. The concern of the philosopher or
semanticist is with the truth of such language. The terms of a contract . . . may be similar in form to the laws of science . . . but they
are fundamentally different in significance. The language of a contract is directed not at describing experience but at controlling human behavior, ordinarily the behavior of the contracting parties.
The concern of a court is not with the truth of the language but with
the expectations that it aroused in the parties. It is therefore to these
expectations, rather than to the concern of the philosopher or semanticist, that we must turn in the search for the meaning of contract language.68
Professor Farnsworth went on to state:
That is not to say that contract law has no concern for truth. If the
seller sells wood as “braziletto,” a court may be called upon to decide whether it is in fact braziletto or peachum. [citation omitted]
But such questions of fact, which concern truth, arise only after
66. See Linguistics, THE FREE DICTIONARY, https://www.thefreedictionary.com/linguistics [perma.cc/25XL-F4WX] (last visited June 29, 2019).
67. Fire Insurance Exchange v. Oltmanns, 416 P.3d 1148, 1163 n.9 (Utah 2018)
(quoting Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics as an Empirical Path to Plain Meaning, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L REV. 156,
160–61 (2012)) (internal quotations omitted).
68. 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §7.7 (3d ed. 2004).
Kar and Radin do not mention or critique Farnsworth’s criticism of the misuse of linguistics.
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questions of interpretation, which go in part to the expectations of
the parties, have been answered: Was the seller bound to deliver
braziletto rather than peachum?69

As Professor Farnsworth correctly points out, linguistics is generally unhelpful in resolving issues of contract interpretation because linguistics focuses
mainly on the truth of communication whereas the primary point of contract
law is to control the behavior of the parties.70 In the above passage, Professor
Farnsworth also acknowledged that contract law does have some concern for
the truth, such as giving a remedy when a defendant misrepresented the nature
and quality of goods delivered to the plaintiff, but this issue is a secondary
concern. By comparison, Kar and Radin – for both sentence meaning and
speaker meaning – analyze only truth telling.71
What is missing from Kar and Radin’s linguistic model is the enforcement
of the reasonable expectations and behavior of the parties.72 Professor Farnsworth is not alone in his skepticism about the use of linguistics in the interpretation of legal texts. Other commentators have observed linguistics is ill-suited
for understanding contracts because linguistics explains generalizations in the
structure and use of language but not how language should be used to manage
contractual expectations and party behavior, which is the point of contract interpretation.73 Other authorities contend that “linguistics may well misunderstand the legal process”74 or “get in the way of moral knowledge.”75 Still, other

69. Id.
70. See Lawrence M. Solan, Can the Legal System Use Experts on Meaning?, 66
TENN. L. REV. 1167, 1170 (1999) (noting that linguists analyze and explain generalizations in the structure and use of language); Id. at 1176 (“It is not the goal of linguistic
theory to tell people how they should understand language.”).
71. See supra Part II (summarizing the elements of the authors’ thesis).
72. See Midwest Division-OPRMC, LLC v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., Div. of Med.
Servs., 241 S.W.3d 371, 379 (Mo. Ct. App. W.D 2007) (stating, “with all contracts, the
courts seek to enforce the reasonable expectations of the parties”).
73. Jiri Janko, Note, Linguistically Integrated Contractual Interpretation, 38
RUTGERS L.J. 601, 628 (2007).
74. Id. at 628 (citing Francis J. Mootz III, Desperately Seeking Science, 73 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1009, 1014–17 (1995)); see also Richard Craswell, Taking Information Seriously: Misrepresentation and Nondisclosure in Contract Law and Elsewhere, 92 VA.
L. REV. 565, 603 (2006) (stating “Grice’s maxims are often vague, and could even be
contradictory as applied in any given case”); Victoria Nourse, Picking and Choosing
Text: Lessons for Statutory Interpretation From the Philosophy of Language, 69 FLA.
L. REV. 1409, 1437 n.40 (2017) (commenting on the “unwieldy and unclear” nature of
Grice’s maxims).
75. Janko, supra note 73, at 628 (citing Michael S. Moore, Plain Meaning and
Linguistics – A Case Study, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1253, 1261–62 (1995) (arguing that a
morally desirable meaning should compete with linguistic determination of the ordinary meaning)).
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writers object to linguists' self-designation of having the utmost expertise in
the interpretation of ordinary meaning.76
The authors did not mention or otherwise rebut Professor Farnsworth’s
conclusion about the poor fit between linguistics and contract interpretation.
For the reasons given in this section, courts should not enact Paul Grice’s theory of linguistics as part of the law of contract interpretation, especially where
Grice had no intent that other writers should use his philosophy in that manner.

B. Shared Meaning Analysis as Evidence at Trial
The authors overlooked that shared meaning analysis would be quite challenging to prove at trial. For example, subjective evidence provided through
the testimony by a party on the meaning of a contract is invariably self-serving
and inherently difficult to verify.77 Accordingly, a party’s testimony of his or
her prior subjective intent that was not expressed or communicated when the
contract was formed is not admissible evidence of intent.78 Given these obstacles, it would be very difficult for either party to submit admissible evidence
of his or her subjective mindset regarding the “actual agreement” unless the
party had manifested this subjective interpretation to his counterpart during negotiations.79
Assuming that the party somehow gets past the above obstacles, another
major evidentiary weakness of shared meaning analysis is the movant would
need to use an expert witness to explain this linguistic theory and its application
to a particular contract. Shared meaning analysis falls within the category of
evidence outside the understanding of most factfinders. Rejecting this type of
proof, the California Second District Court of Appeal has said, “The opinion
of a linguist or other expert as to the meaning of contract language is irrelevant
to the court's task of interpreting the plain language of the contract.”80 This
principle draws upon the notion that expert testimony of issues of law, either
in the form of legal conclusions or discussion of the legal implications of evidence, is inadmissible.81
76. Id. at 628, n. 168.
77. SR Int’l. Bus. Ins. Co., Ltd. v. World Trade Center Properties, LLC, 467 F.3d
107, 127 (2d Cir. 2006); Dugan v. Smerick Sewerage Co., 142 F.3d 398, 403–04 (7th
Cir. 1998); Apeldyn Corp. v. Eidos, LLC, 943 F. Supp. 2d. 1145, 1149 (D. Or. 2013).
78. Apeldyn Corp., 943 F. Supp. 2d. at 1149. Another bar to judicial consideration
of a party’s subjective intent is where the evidence arises during settlement discussions.
See FED. R. EVID. 408 (stating evidence of conduct or a statement made in compromise
negotiations is not admissible).
79. See infra Part VI.E
80. See Jordan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 116 Cal. App. 4th 1206, 1217–18 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 2004); CAL. EVID. CODE § 801 (insurance policy).
81. Marx & Co., Inc. v. Diners’ Club, Inc., 550 F.2d 505, 510 (2d Cir. 1977) (“The
question of interpretation of the contract is for the jury and the question of legal effect
is for the judge. In neither case do [courts] permit expert testimony”) (quoting Loeb v.
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The second flaw in Kar and Radin’s use of linguistics is the authors’ bias
in favor of consumers and against merchants. Kar and Radin consistently analyzed the concept of “shared meaning” analysis just from the perspective of
the consumer – who is only one of the two parties to the contract.82 For Kar
and Radin, the term “speaker meaning,” refers to the consumer because the
speaker whose views take pre-eminence is always the consumer.83 This emphasis on the favored consumer in contract interpretation is incorrect because
the “mutual intent” of the parties is controlling.84 As the Tennessee Court of
Appeals has stated, “In construing contracts, the words expressing the parties’
intentions should be given their usual, natural and ordinary meaning, and neither party is to be favored in the construction.”85 The authors’ thesis did not
sufficiently heed that there are always two speakers – the promisor and a promisee – under a contact and that the voices of both the seller and the buyer merit
due consideration.86
In IFC Credit Corp. v. United Business & Industrial Federal Credit Un87
ion, then-Chief Judge Frank Easterbrook of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit focused on the harm to the contracting system when a court
favors one party over another in commercial transactions:

Hammond, 407 F.2d 779, 781 (7th Cir. 1969)); Nieves–Villanueva v. Soto–Rivera, 133
F.3d 92, 99 (1st Cir. 1997); Sparton Corp. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 1, 8 (2007)
(stating it is inappropriate to have experts opine as to the legal obligations of the parties
under contract).
82. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1143.
83. See, e.g., id. at 1139 (Apple iTunes consumer); id. at 1192–96 (used car purchaser); id. at 1210 (E-book purchase); id. at 1199–1201 (business premises insurance).
84. “[T]he fundamental goal of contract interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intent of the parties as it existed at the time of contracting.” U.S. Cellular Inv. Co.
v. GTE Mobilnet, Inc., 281 F.3d 929, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
85. Forrest Constr. Co., LLC v. Laughlin, 337 S.W.3d 211, 220 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2009); Rainey v. Stansell, 836 S.W.2d 117, 119 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (emphasis
added); see also Burke v. Reiter, 42 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Iowa 1950) (“The law knows
no such thing as a rich man or a poor man, but seeks to treat all alike to the end that
even justice may be dispensed.”).
86. Courts (and commentators) correctly construe reasonable understanding from
the vantage point of both parties. See, e.g., Int’l Marine Underwriters v. ABCD Marine,
313 P.3d 395, 399 (Wash. 2013) (the primary objective in contract interpretation “is to
ascertain the mutual intent of the parties at the time they executed the contract”) (emphasis added); see also Larry A. DiMatteo, The Counterpoise of Contracts: The Reasonable Person Standard and the Subjectivity of Judgment, 48 S.C. L. REV. 293, 334
(1997) (“The reasonable person is a product of the creative efforts of the promisor and
promisee. As such, neither party's perspective alone can adequately serve the interpretive mandate of the reasonable person.”) (emphasis added).
87. 512 F.3d 989 (7th Cir. 2008).
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As long as the price is negotiable and the customer may shop elsewhere,
consumer protection comes from competition rather than judicial intervention. Making the institution of contract unreliable by trying to adjust
matters ex post in favor of the weaker party will just make weaker parties worse off in the long run.
....
The idea that favoring one side or the other in a class of contract disputes can redistribute wealth is one of the most persistent illusions of
judicial power. It comes from failing to consider the full consequences
of legal decisions. Courts deciding contract cases cannot durably shift
the balance of advantages to the weaker side of the market; they can
only make contracts more costly to that side in the future, because [the
other side] will demand compensation for bearing onerous terms.88

Regrettably, the merchant’s valid objectives and society’s interests in a
stable, predictable contracting environment merit little weight in Kar and Radin’s equation.

III. BOILERPLATE, STANDARD FORM CONTRACTS, AND ADHESION
CONTRACTS: DEFINITIONAL ISSUES
This Part addresses the adequacy of Kar and Radin’s definition of boilerplate and their failure to employ established definitions of this concept. This
Part also takes issue with their consistently unfavorable treatment of boilerplate
and failure to cite the many benefits of this staple of commercial relationships.

A. The Overly Broad Definition of Boilerplate
The authors defined “boilerplate text” as “any preformatted text that is
provided during contract formation to multiple parties, on multiple occasions,
or both.”89 At best, this formulation is idiosyncratic. The mere existence of
preformatted or standardized contract terms alone is benign and not objectionable; it is the contractual content that determines whether boilerplate facilitates
or impedes the goals of the contracting system. Surprisingly, the authors failed
to mention by name or to explain in any depth the most commonly encountered
contract type in this area: the so-called contract of adhesion. These contracts
incorporate – and go beyond – the elements of ‘boilerplate’ and ‘standard’
forms.90

88. Id. at 993 (quoting Original Great Am. Chocolate Chip Cookie Co. v. River
Valley Cookies, Ltd., 970 F.2d 273, 282 (7th Cir. 1992)).
89. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1139 n.8.
90. See Max True Plastering Co. v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861, 864
(Okla. 1996).
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Unlike standard form contracts, “adhesion contracts” characteristically
reflect a definite market advantage in favor of the merchant and his superior
bargaining power. A leading decision explains the prevailing understanding of
adhesion contracts:
An adhesion contract is a standardized contract prepared entirely by one
party to the transaction for the acceptance of the other. These contracts,
because of the disparity in bargaining power between the draftsman and
the second party, must be accepted or rejected on a “take it or leave it”
basis without opportunity for bargaining – the services contracted for
cannot be obtained except by acquiescing to the form agreement.91

Contrary to Kar and Radin’s suggestion that “assimilationists” have done
little to counter the potential adverse impacts of boilerplate, the majority of
courts give weight to possible merchant misuse of adhesion contracts, which is
why these jurisdictions scrutinize contracts of adhesion “skeptically.”92 Thus,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Appeals of West Virginia observed that it gives
“greater scrutiny” to an adhesive contract.”93 Along similar lines, case law
from California provides that where a contract limits the duties or liability of
the stronger party, a court will not enforce it against the weaker party absent
“plain and clear notification” of the terms and the adherent's “understanding
consent.”94 Additionally, a boilerplate contract that a merchant offers to consumers on a take it or leave it basis can be procedurally unconscionable.95
Next, consider the interpretive maxim of contra proferentem. Under this
principle, when a standardized contract between parties of unequal bargaining
power is ambiguous because it is open to two reasonable interpretations, but

91. Id. A standard form contract is similar to, though not identical with, a contract
of adhesion. See Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 605 A.2d 681, 685
(N.J. 1992) (stating that the “essential nature of a contract of adhesion is that it is presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, commonly in a standardized printed form, without
opportunity for the ‘adhering’ party to negotiate except perhaps on a few particulars.”).
Because Kar and Radin are quite concerned with the economic plight of consumers
when faced with standardized contracts, I believe the authors would similarly be concerned with adhesion contracts.
92. Rory v. Continental Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 52 n.13 (Mich. 2005) (Kelly, J.,
dissenting) (collecting numerous cases applying rule of skepticism).
93. Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 729 S.E.2d 217, 228 (W. Va. 2012) (“A
contract of adhesion should receive greater scrutiny than a contract with bargained-for
items to determine if it imposes terms that are oppressive, unconscionable or beyond
the reasonable expectations of an ordinary person.”).
94. Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 783–84 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1976).
95. Flores v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 4th 846, 853 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001); Brown v. Genesis Healthcare Corp., 729 S.E.2d 217, 227 (W. Va. 2012)
(stating that procedural unconscionability “often begins with a contract of adhesion”).

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

17

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 7

728

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

the use of the established canons of construction fail to resolve the inconsistency, a reviewing court may interpret the contract in the manner least favorable to the merchant as the stronger party who was the drafter of the agreement.96
The above rules of skepticism in various jurisdictions are in addition to
the consumer-friendly general doctrine in a number of states that ambiguities
in an insurance contract are construed in accordance with the reasonable expectations of the insured.97 Indeed, some decisions go beyond insurance law
and tilt more strongly in favor of the consumer by making general allowances
for a consumer’s having a lesser “level of sophistication” when courts determine the existence of mutual assent.98 Kar and Radin’s omission of these various consumer-oriented doctrines calls into question the authors’ objections to
the so-called assimilationist position.

B. The Benefits and Detriments of Boilerplate
In contrast with Kar and Radin’s heavy criticism of consumer contracts
merely because these instruments have boilerplate terms, courts and commentators have pointed out the value-added nature of boilerplate contracting.
Courts have acknowledged the benefits of such standardized contracts as
being part of the “fabric of society.”99 For one, they can eliminate some everyday frustrations. As an example, most persons would find it highly annoying
to stand in a long line at the airport car rental desk where every traveler took
his time seeking to negotiate a tailored rental car agreement. To avoid such
96. Savedoff v. Access Grp., Inc., 524 F.3d 754, 764 (6th Cir. 2008); Ohio Cas.
Ins. Co. v. Holcim, 744 F. Supp. 2d 1251, 1260 (S.D. Ala. 2010).
97. See e.g., New Castle Cnty. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 243 F.3d 744, 750 (3d
Cir. 2001); Karnette v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 444 F. Supp. 2d 640, 646–47
(E.D. Va. 2006). Some jurisdictions extend the principle to unambiguous insurance
policies in “exceptional” cases. See Mitchell v. Providence Washington Ins. Co., 255
F. Supp. 2d 487, 494 (E.D. Pa. 2003). However, courts are divided on this doctrine.
See Arthur J. Park, What to Reasonably Expect in the Coming Years from the Reasonable Expectations of the Insured Doctrine, 49 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 165 (2012). Kar
and Radin discuss this doctrine but conclude that it is mostly confined to the interpretation of insurance policies. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1201.
98. See Wright v. SSC Nashville Operating Co., No. 3:16-cv-00768, 2017 WL
914586 at *2 (M.D. Tenn. Mar. 8, 2017) (ruling that “an individual consumer may be
held not to have assented in a situation where a more sophisticated commercial entity
would [have been deemed to concur on the contact].”) (citing Wofford v. M.J. Edwards
& Sons Funeral Home Inc., 490 S.W.3d 800, 812 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015)). “An evergrowing body of case law and scholarship has fashioned a rigid dichotomy between
sophisticated and unsophisticated parties in a wide array of contract inquiries.” Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 MO. L.
REV. 493, 493–94 (2010).
99. Goodwin v. Ford Motor Co., 970 F. Supp. 1007, 1015 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (quoting Roberson v. Money Tree of Ala., Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1519, 1528 (M.D. Ala. 1997)).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss3/7

18

Feldman: Actual Agreement, Shared Meaning Analysis, and the Invalidation o

2019]

BOILERPLATE INVALIDATION

729

problems, standardization of forms for contracts is a rational and economically
efficient response to the rapidity of market transactions and the high costs of
negotiations, such that the drafter can rationally calculate the costs and risks of
performance. This process in turn contributes to reasonable pricing.100 The
Seventh Circuit commented,
Phrases become boilerplate when many parties find that the language
serves their ends. That’s a reason to enforce the promises, not to disregard them.
....
Contractual language serves its functions only if enforced consistently.
This is one of the advantages of boilerplate, which usually has a record
of predictable interpretation and application.101

Furthermore, the absence of back-and-forth bargaining – as frequently
occurs with boilerplate contracts – is not necessarily unfair to consumers. As
Judge Richard Posner put it, “[W]hat is important is not whether there is haggling in every transaction but whether competition forces sellers to incorporate
in their standard contracts terms that protect the purchasers.”102
Indeed, the vast majority of form contract terms deployed in the American
commercial system are not problematic. Generally, these boilerplate terms are
legitimate and reasonable components of the agreement, which means these
provisions usually are unobjectionable.103 Typically, merchants do not use
these instruments to oppress consumers as Kar and Radin repeatedly alleged.104
As a pair of commentators writing in the Columbia Law Review observed:
For many years, contract literature focused on the idea that sellers with
market power draft contracts that are disadvantageous to consumers.
100. 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.4 (rev. ed 1993); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 211 cmt. a (AM. LAW. INST. 1981)) (“Standardization of
agreements serves many of the same functions as standardization of goods and services;
both are essential to a system of mass production and distribution. Scarce and costly
time and skill can be devoted to a class of transactions rather than the details of individual transactions.”); John J. A. Burke, Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 289 (2000).
101. Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381, 384–85 (7th Cir. 2000).
102. Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in Augmented Reality: The Case of Consumer Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676, 711 (2012) (quoting RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 144 (8th ed. 2011)).
103. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS, 348 n.3 (6th
ed. 2009) (“Probably most contracts of adhesion are simple and reasonable.”).
104. See, e.g., Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1140 (“The fake ‘terms’ in a regime
of pseudo-contract invite burgeoning forms of deception that are difficult for courts to
discern because they are hidden under the mantle of ‘contract.’”).
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Law and economics scholars, however, have been skeptical about that
hypothesis, pointing out that a strategy of dictating pro-seller contract
terms would rarely be the optimal technique for exploiting market
power.105

Professor M.J. Trebilcock has made a similarly well-reasoned economic
analysis of standard form contracts, concluding:
[T]he proposition that the use of consumer standard-form contracts is
the result of the concentration of market power is entirely without factual foundation. The reason why such contracts are used is . . . to reduce
transaction costs . . . [S]tandard forms are used (for this reason) in
countless contexts where no significant degree of market concentration
exists . . . The fact that in these cases a supplier's products are offered
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis is evidence not of market power but of a
recognition that neither producer – nor consumer – interests in aggregate are served by incurring the costs involved in negotiating separately
every transaction. The use of standard forms is a totally spurious proxy
for the existence of market power.106

Kar and Radin did not meaningfully support their theme that boilerplate
unfairly gives sellers a market advantage over consumers by imposing onerous,
one-sided terms.107 Nevertheless, to her credit, Radin, in her prior publications,
did mention the recognized benefits of boilerplate.108 She acknowledged, “In
the abstract standardization is neither good nor bad,” and she conceded that a
standardized form can promote knowledge and ease of use, reduce uncertainty,
and lower transaction costs for all parties.109 She also cited with approval the
example of perhaps the most prevalent type of standard form contracts – the
insurance policy – and how it facilitates commercial transactions.110 Radin has
105. Ronald J. Mann & Travis Siebeinicher, Just One Click: The Reality of Internet
Retail Contracting, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 984, 984–85 (2008). The actual incidence of
merchant abuse is far less than indicated by Kar and Radin. Supra note 4, at 1174–75.
Some experts dispute the frequent contention that corporations misuse boilerplate and
thereby increase profits and market share. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate
Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 938 (2006).
106. Michael J. Trebilcock, The Doctrine of Inequality of Bargaining Power: PostBenthamite Economics in the House of Lords, 26 U. TORONTO L. J. 359, 364 (1976)).
107. See e.g., Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1145 (stating businesses often create
legal obligations “ [ u]nilaterally without obtaining any actual agreement over many
boilerplate “terms”); id. at 1196 (“market forces have begun to interact with assimilationist legal doctrine to create powerful incentives for businesses systematically to mislead consumers through what is sometimes called careful contract design.”).
108. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING
RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW 42 (2014).
109. Id.
110. Id.
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repeatedly endorsed the general concept of contract standardization in her prior
publications111 and no apparent reason exists for her shift in position.
Despite Kar and Radin’s contention that some boilerplate is unfair and
borders on being fraudulent,112 case law and many commentators accept that
form contracts are not “inherently sinister” and “any rule automatically invalidating adhesion contracts would be ‘completely unworkable.’”113 The Seventh
Circuit recognized that no reason existed to treat “adhesion contracts or form
contracts differently” from other contract types.114 In fact, over the last thirtyfive or so years, “[i]t has been hard to find decisions holding terms invalid on
the ground that something is wrong with non-negotiable terms in form contracts.”115
111. See Margaret Jane Radin, The Deformation of Contract in the Information Society, 37 J. LEGAL STUDIES 534, 543 (2017) (“I am not arguing against standardization,
nor am I arguing against all standardization in the field of contracts.”); MARGARET J.
RADIN, supra note 108, at 42 (“Yet, if all attempts to use boilerplate were to be declared
unenforceable, that would cause a considerable disruption of current commercial practice.”).
112. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
113. Swain v. Auto Servs., Inc, 128 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003). A host
of prominent commentators rejects the abolition of boilerplate:
Robert Hillman declares that “because of the efficiencies and benefits of
standard forms, it is not a reach to predict that the economy would come to
a screeching halt without them.” Arthur Leff states that living entirely without boilerplate is “commercially absurd” due to “the economics of the mass
distribution of goods.” Nancy Kim hypothesizes that “failure to recognize
contracts of adhesion would mean slowing down and perhaps even stifling
the growth of a valuable industry.” Eric Posner asserts that “[c]ontracts are
long and detailed by necessity.”
And David Slawson sums up the consensus:
The predominance of standard forms is the best evidence of their necessity.
They are characteristic of a mass production society and an integral part of
it . . . These services are essential, and if they are to be provided at reasonable cost, they must be standardized and mass-produced like other goods
and services in an industrial economy.
James Gibson, Boilerplate’s False Dichotomy, 106 GEO. L.J. 249, 264 (2019).
114. Heller Fin., Inc. v. Midwhey Powder Co., Inc. 883 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir.
1989).
115. IFC Credit Corp. v. United Bus. & Indus. Fed. Credit Union, 512 F.3d 989,
993 (7th Cir. 2008). Older cases divided on the propriety of adhesion contracts. Compare Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 147 (Pa. Super. 1985) (“The
phrase ‘contract of adhesion’ and the evil it suggests have been familiar for many
years.”), with Klos v. Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 169 (2d Cir. 1997) (adhesion contracts
“offend[] basic notions of civility and fair play”), and Powell v. Cent. Cal. Fed. Sav. &
Loan Assn., 130 Cal. Rptr. 635, 642 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (“There is nothing sinful
or illegal about a contract of adhesion.”) and State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d
265, 273 (W. Va. 2002) (the question for courts is distinguishing “good adhesion contracts which should be enforced from bad adhesion contracts which should not.”).
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While the authors complained that boilerplate unfairly grants sellers a
substantial economic advantage,116 despite any appeal this fact might have politically or socially, their claim has no legal traction. Courts consistently rule
that it is not their place to remedy disparities of wealth in society, the levels of
information known to each party, or the comparative bargaining skills of buyers and sellers.117 Aggressive bargaining positions alone in boilerplate contracts are proper and advance the objectives of our free market economy. 118
Because nothing inappropriate would result when a merchant simply drafts
terms that will strongly ensure that the seller would prevail in any litigation
with a buyer, Kar and Radin’s doctrinal and normative critique of modern-day
standardized contracting is unpersuasive. 119

116. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1140.
117. See Schreiber Foods, Inc. v. Lei Wang, 651 F.3d 678, 683 (7th Cir. 2011) (also
noting without objection that “[t]here is often an extreme asymmetry of information
between seller and buyer when the seller is the provider of a professional service.”);
PXRE Reinsurance Co. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 342 F. Supp. 2d 752, 761 (N.D.
Ill. 2004) (“Transactions almost always begin with asymmetry of information, but that
[fact] does not eliminate the need for the less-informed party to exercise ordinary prudence.”); Eric H. Franklin, Mandating Precontractual Disclosure, 67 U. MIAMI L. REV.
553, 581 (2013) (arguing that information asymmetry is the norm in contracting).
118. Industrial Representatives, Inc. v. CP Clare Corp., 74 F.3d 128, 132 (7th Cir.
1989) (“Parties to contracts are entitled to seek, and retain, personal advantage; striving
for that advantage is the source of much economic progress.”); Dick Broad. Co., Inc.
of Tennessee v. Oak Ridge FM, Inc., 395 S.W.3d 653, 671 (Tenn. 2013) (“[P]arties
engaged in a commercial transaction pursue their own self-interest and understand and
expect that the parties with whom they are dealing are doing likewise.”).
119. Several commentators have challenged the prevailing view that standard-form
contracts have eliminated bargaining in consumer contracts. Citing empirical studies,
Jason Scott Johnston argued that standard-form contracts “[f]acilitate bargaining and
are a crucial instrument in the establishment and maintenance of cooperative relationships between firms and their customers.” Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain:
An Economic Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857, 858 (2006). Professor Johnston studied widely used consumer contracts, including hospital bills, consumer credit cards, home-mortgage and home-equity lending, the rent-to-own industry
and retail sales return policies. Id. at 864. Other writers similarly have relied on empirical findings that mass-market boilerplate contracts are much more negotiable in fact
than they are in theory. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 828 (2006) (contending that based on reputational concerns, some merchants selectively enforce standard
form contracts against purchasers). Kar and Radin do not mention these empirical findings but merely assume that boilerplate terms are typically non-negotiable. See supra
note 4, at 1137, 1140.
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IV. ASSIMILATIONIST CONTRACT THEORY AND BOILERPLATE: HAS
THE LAW KEPT PACE WITH TWENTY FIRST CENTURY
COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY?
Kar and Radin noted the rapid developments in technology that have
changed how parties communicate to form contracts.120 The authors focused
on electronic-commerce and clickwrap, browsewrap, and shrinkwrap transactions.121 Thus, even as courts have tried “valiantly” to extend traditional contract law doctrines to the new technology, Kar and Radin asserted that the judiciary has failed to make the transition.122 They contended that courts have
overlooked the effects of technology, thereby causing a fundamental “break in
function” in the institution of contract itself.123
As indicated above, Kar and Radin claimed that courts have “struggled”
in the application of standard common law principles to modern day boilerplate.124 Beyond observing that the cases “are not altogether satisfying,”125 the
authors failed to explain why the few cases they cited show that courts misunderstand boilerplate or why traditional common law principles for interpreting
boilerplate are deficient in the modern-day setting.
Contrary to the authors’ observations, courts are competent in their understanding of the technological changes in contracting. The judicial consensus is that these developments have not rendered traditional interpretive principles obsolete.126 Thus, courts have made statements such as, “While new
commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many new situations, it has not
fundamentally changed the principles of contract.”127 As shown below, two

120. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1139.
121. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1141 n.15, 1176, 1198, 1208. “Shrinkwrap” is
a type of license printed on the outside of a package wrapper, especially a software
package, to advise the buyer that by opening the package, the buyer becomes legally
bound to abide by the terms of the license. Shrinkwrap Agreement, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). “Clickwrap” is an electronic version of a shrinkwrap
license in which a computer user agrees to the terms of an electronically displayed
agreement by pointing the cursor to a particular location on the screen and then clicking.
Point and Click Agreement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). A “browsewrap” agreement does not require the user to manifest assent to the terms and conditions expressly; a party instead gives his assent simply by using the website. Nguyen v.
Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1176 (9th Cir. 2014).
122. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1141–42.
123. Id. at 1142.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1141 n.15.
126. Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2003); Nguyen v.
Barnes & Noble, Inc., 763 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2014); Treiber & Straub, Inc. v.
U.P.S, 474 F.3d 379, 385 (7th Cir. 2007).
127. Register.com, Inc., 356 F.3d at 403.
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leading decisions that the authors criticized – Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.128 and ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg129 – illustrate this truth in
various ways.

A. Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp.
In Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., the consumer was a user
of Netscape software and contended that he was not bound by a provision requiring him to arbitrate disputes with the company.130 The issue was whether
the seller adequately disclosed the term as part of the transaction.131 Netscape
merely posted the terms of its offer of the software – including the obligation
to arbitrate disputes – on the website from which users downloaded the software.132 In resolving this dispute about the licensing of consumer software and
the enforceability of an arbitration clause, the Specht court relied heavily on
common law principles of contract.133
In Specht, the U.S Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit – in an opinion
written by then Judge Sonia Sotomayor – began by stating that under the established objective theory of contract formation, “Mutual manifestation of assent, whether by written or spoken word or by conduct, is the touchstone of
contract.”134 In keeping with these traditional principles, the court observed,
“At bottom, the objective standard . . . considers both what the offeree said,
wrote, or did and the transactional context in which the offeree verbalized or
acted.”135 Yet, the Specht court properly cautioned, “The conduct of a party is
not effective as a manifestation of his assent unless he intends to engage in the
conduct and knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer from
his conduct that he assents.”136
The Specht court accepted the general propositions that (a) “[a] voluntary
acceptance of the benefit of a transaction is equivalent to a consent to all the
obligations arising from it, so far as the facts are known, or ought to be known,
to the person accepting,”137 and (b) “[a] party cannot avoid the terms of a contract on the ground that he or she failed to read it before signing the document.”138 However, Judge Sotomayor was quick to add: “An exception to this

128. 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
129. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
130. 306 F.3d at 27.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 35.
134. Id. at 30.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 29.
137. Id. at 30 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE § 1589 (2018)).
138. Id. at 39 (quoting Marin Storage & Trucking, Inc. v. Benco Contracting &
Eng’g, 89 Cal. App. 4th 1042, 1049 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)).
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general rule exists when the writing does not appear to be a contract and the
terms are not called to the attention of the recipient. In such a case, no contract
is formed with respect to the undisclosed term.” 139
Accordingly, Kar and Radin were off-base in contending without any
analysis that the unanimous Specht panel “struggled” to reach its decision or
that it “misunderstood” the particulars of modern day contracting and computer
technology.140 The Second Circuit’s opinion in Specht displayed a complete
command of how modern-day technology differs from “the world of paper contracting.”141 The Specht court mentioned the “emergent world of online product delivery, pop-up screens, hyperlinked pages, clickwrap licensing, scrollable
documents, and urgent admonitions to ‘Download Now.’”142 While it endorsed
the longstanding principle that the consumer can be bound where the merchant
sufficiently placed the buyer on notice to inquire further about the terms, the
Second Circuit concluded that Netscape had failed to make a sufficient disclosure to the consumer of the arbitration clause at issue.143 Indeed, nowhere in
their article did Kar and Radin cite a single case where a court misunderstood
the computer technology at issue and how that lack of knowledge tainted the
court’s analysis and decision.144
The Specht case and decisions like it have relied upon long-established
common law principles of mutual assent – including the rules on inquiry notice
– dating back almost one hundred years.145 Notably, the high quality of
Specht’s factual and legal analysis fully supports the idea that courts are up to
the task of deciding controversies involving e-commerce.146 Accordingly, the
139. Id. at 30.
140. See also Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 478 (2002) (computer technology
has not radically changed consumer contracting).
141. Specht, 306 F.3d at 32 (comparing digital and paper contracts). For another
insightful opinion from the Second Circuit that thoroughly and persuasively considered
the enforceability of shrinkwrap, see Schnabel v. Trilegant Corp., 697 F.3d 110 (2d Cir.
2012).
142. Specht, 306 F.3d at 31.
143. Id. at 32.
144. The authors do not mention the increased convenience to consumers associated with modern e-commerce methods. It seems logical that most consumers would
much rather be able to download software or media off the internet than go to a store
and buy a disk. It also seems paradoxical that something that makes consumers lives
easier requires harsher contractual interpretations against sellers.
145. See Specht, 306 F.3d at 28 (citing Windsor Mills, Inc. v. Collins & Aikman
Corp., 101 Cal. Rptr. 347, 350 (1972)).
146. 2 SAMUEL L. WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §
6:3 (4th ed. 2019). The current version of the Williston treatise also gives Specht high
praise, stating it is “[a]n exceptional case, with far-reaching implications regarding
electronic contracting, containing an excellent discussion of the objective theory as it
pertains to the law of offer and acceptance and to the developing law of electronic contracting.” Id.
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Specht court properly held against Netscape and in favor of the software user
because the evidence did not demonstrate that the user who downloaded
Netscape's software had necessarily seen the terms of the company’s offer, including the arbitration clause.147

B. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg
In ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg,148 the Seventh Circuit held, in a unanimous
opinion by Judge Frank Easterbrook, that a buyer of software was bound by an
agreement that was included within the packaging and that later appeared when
the buyer first used the software.149 Here, the consumer purchased software in
a box containing license terms that the software company – the offeror – displayed prominently on the computer screen every time the user opened the
software program.150 The consumer failed to return the software in accordance
with the instructions.151 The ProCD court held that because the user under the
inquiry notice doctrine had sufficient opportunity to review the terms and to
return the software, the consumer was contractually bound after retaining the
product past the point allowed by the vendor.152
The ProCD court recognized the major challenge in these cases is that the
consumer's assent is largely passive with no requirement for the buyer to make
an overt response in rejecting the offer.153 Thus, the question of the buyer's
acceptance of the license terms frequently turns on whether a reasonably prudent consumer – offeree – would be on inquiry notice of the term at issue.154
Under the common law, a party may exhibit assent through words or silence,
action or inaction, but with one important qualification: “[t]he conduct of a
party is not effective as a manifestation of his assent unless he intends to engage
in the conduct and knows or has reason to know that the other party may infer
147. Specht, 306 F.3d at 32. The authors’ remark that Specht’s analysis “struggled”
and is not “altogether satisfying” is unjustified. See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1141
n.15. Oddly enough, given that the Second Circuit sided with the consumer in ruling
the arbitration clause was in effect a ride along clause, the reader would have expected
Kar and Radin to make this influential case the showcase precedent in support of shared
meaning analysis. See Specht, 306 F.3d 20–21.
148. 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1450.
151. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 908 F. Supp. 640, 644–45 (W.D. Wis. 1996), rev’d,
86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
152. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. The agreement included the following language:
“By using the discs and the listings licensed to you, you agree to be bound by the terms
of this License. If you do not agree to the terms of this License, promptly return all
copies of the software, listings that may have been exported, the discs and the User
Guide to the place where you obtained it.” Id.
153. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1451.
154. Id.
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from his conduct that he assents.”155 In other words, to constitute inquiry notice, to manifest his agreement, the purchaser must have actual notice of circumstances that would be adequate to place upon a prudent person the obligation to make further inquiry into the matter. If the purchaser lacked such means
of knowledge, the purchaser has not adequately manifested agreement to the
packaged terms.
The ProCD result comports with the general common law rule that an
offeree cannot actually assent to an offer unless the offeree first has notice of
its existence and terms.156 Therefore, assent will occur based on the “[s]tandard
contract doctrine that when a benefit is offered subject to stated conditions, and
the offeree makes a decision to take the benefit with knowledge of the terms of
the offer, the taking constitutes an acceptance of the terms, which accordingly
become binding on the offeree.”157 It bears repeating: each case is fact specific
regarding the offeree's notice of the terms in question.
Because the product in question – computer software – is a “good” under
the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”),158 the ProCD court turned to the
UCC for guidance in resolving the issue of consumer assent.159 The court first
held that UCC § 2–207 – Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation –
was inapplicable because the UCC § 2-207 “battle-of-the-forms” provision was
irrelevant in cases involving only one form.160 The ProCD Court then evaluated the agreement under UCC § 2–204. Here, the court reasoned that based
on the latter Code section (which accepts the common law rule), “[a] vendor,
as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose
limitations on the kind of conduct that constitutes acceptance. A buyer may
accept by performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as acceptance.”161
Accordingly, the ProCD court found UCC § 2-204 dispositive.162
In a subsequent decision, Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,163 the Seventh Circuit relied heavily on ProCD in explaining the fit between the contract analyzed in that decision, common law principles, and the need for a smoothly
running economy:

155. Schnabel v. Trilegiant Corp., 697 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2012). Thus, “a person who accepts the benefit of services rendered may be held to have impliedly made
a promise through conduct to pay for them . . . [if] the offeree . . . knew or had reason
to know that the party performing expected compensation.” Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 128.
158. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1450 (“[s]oftware licenses . . . [are] governed by the common law of contracts and the Uniform Commercial Code”).
159. Id.
160. ProCD, 908 F. Supp. at 655.
161. ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1452. Under the traditional rules of contract formation,
ProCD created the power of acceptance and could dictate the mode of assent. Id.
162. Id.
163. 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir 1997).
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Payment preceding the revelation of full terms is common for air transportation, insurance, and many other endeavors. Practical considerations support allowing vendors to enclose the full legal terms with their
products. Cashiers cannot be expected to read legal documents to customers before ringing up sales. If the staff at the other end of the phone
for direct-sales operations such as Gateway's had to read the four-page
statement of terms before taking the buyer's credit card number, the
droning voice would anesthetize rather than enlighten many potential
buyers . . . Customers as a group are better off when vendors skip costly
and ineffectual steps such as telephonic recitation and use instead a simple approve-or-return device. Competent adults are bound by such documents, read or unread. 164

Although many commentators and some courts have criticized the ProCD
decision,165 ProCD represents the majority view in the United States.166 The
main disagreement is whether the consumer’s merely accepting delivery of the
product and failing to return the items as required by the agreement reasonably
manifests consent to the additional terms in the “shrink wrapped” box.167
The Rhode Island Supreme Court has explained that ProCD’s perspective
is well reasoned and “[m]ore consistent with contemporary consumer transactions.”168 Specifically, the Rhode Island court pointed out that it is “[s]imply
unreasonable to expect a seller to apprise a consumer of every term and condition at the moment he or she makes a purchase.”169 To the same effect, Professor Randy Barnett has succinctly argued in defense of ProCD that the decision comports with settled law regarding the process of acceptance.170 As Barnette concluded, “This insight is neither revolutionary nor reactionary.”171

164. Id. at 1149.
165. Nancy S. Kim, Clicking and Cringing, 86 OR. L. REV. 797, 839 (2007) (“As
many scholars have noted, the ProCD court's analysis of the U.C.C. leaves much to be
desired.”).
166. DeFontes v. Dell, Inc., 984 A.2d 1061, 1069–71 (R.I. 2009).
167. Id. Professor Randy Barnett has argued in defense of ProCD that the decision
comports with settled law regarding the process of acceptance. Barnett, supra note 3,
at 644. First, he mentions that under UCC § 2-204, a party can manifest acceptance “in
any manner sufficient to show agreement, including the conduct of the parties. Id. at
643–44. Second, he follows the principle that offer and acceptance can occur in stages,
provided the circumstances or prior practice makes this point clear or adequate notice
is provided. Id. at 644.
168. Defontes, 984 A.2d at 1071.
169. Id. at 1071.
170. Barnett, supra note 3, at 644.
171. Id.
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C. Boilerplate and Computer Technology
In today’s world of tech-savvy consumers, the authors’ contention is unsupported that fact finders and reviewing courts make poor decisions on the
factual and legal issues because they do not understand changes in computer
technology and on-line contracting.172
Undoubtedly, the general topic of cognitive heuristics biases (the construct from psychology that people irrationally underestimate the possibility of
adverse consequences, such as illnesses, accidents, and errors), sometimes lead
people to make faulty choices.173 Nonetheless, consumers as a class are not so
benighted as to qualify for the outdated paternalistic viewpoint that they are
incapable of making their own fully rational and informed choices regarding
electronic commerce.174 If the buyer is a “competent adult,” courts should not
become a member of the buyer’s team at the “negotiation table.”175
A commentator noted the economic downside of failing to enforce otherwise legitimate adhesive terms:
[A] refusal to enforce adhesive terms is just as bad as imposing price
controls on products. Both actions substitute the top-down, paternalistic
judgment of lawmakers for the bottom-up, nuanced judgment of the
marketplace – preventing consumers from acting on their own individualized preferences and myopically privileging contract content over
contracting process.176

If judges and juries can understand complex factual issues in patent, antitrust, and tax litigation, they can comprehend the much simpler workings of
browsewrap, clickwrap, and shrinkwrap in retail online computer contracting.177

172. See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1139 (noting impact of “momentous changes
in communications technology”).
173. Id. at 1196.
174. See generally Honorable v. Easy Life Real Estate Sys., 100 F. Supp. 2d 885,
888 (N.D. Ill. 2000) (“Courts have been reluctant to assume consumers are too ignorant
and benighted to fend for themselves merely because they are poor.”).
175. Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir 1997); Rothe v.
Revco D.S., Inc., 148 F.3d 672, 675–76 (7th Cir. 1998); see also Bank of Maryville v.
Topping, 393 S.W.2d 280, 284 (Tenn. 1965) (improper for courts to draft contracts for
parties).
176. Gibson, supra note 113, at 254.
177. The authors claim that ours “is a computer-based information society,” but this
statement is exaggerated. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1139. The secondary literature’s near-obsession with online contracting over-emphasizes the importance of Internet commerce. While this form of contracting certainly is substantial, a study in 2016
revealed that e-commerce accounted for only 15.6% of consumer transactions. See
Amy Gesenhues, Report: E-Commerce Accounted for 11.7% of Total Retail Sales in
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V. ACTUAL AGREEMENT, SHARED MEANING ANALYSIS, AND
CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
Kar and Radin said that “an actual agreement with common meaning is
central to the normative justification of contract.”178 The authors’ bold position
was that, notwithstanding physical presence in the document – or on a computer screen – boilerplate without actual agreement lacks contractual status.179
The authors said this widespread use of pseudo-contracts and their “fake
terms,” i.e., not actual terms, invited “burgeoning forms of [consumer] deception.”180 Kar and Radin were especially critical of the “assimilationist” courts
and commentators whom the authors said embrace fictionalized purchaser assent as the basis for mutual obligation.181
The gist of the authors’ proposal was that by referring to “shared meaning,” a concept that “builds” on linguistics, Kar and Radin advocated that
courts enforce “[t]he meaning that parties produce and agree to during contract
formation that is most consistent with the presupposition that both were using
language cooperatively to form a contract.”182 Culling concepts from linguistics, this process requires an understanding of two key Gricean concepts –
speaker meaning and sentence meaning. “Speaker meaning” is what a speaker
intends when he or she utters a sentence.183 “Sentence meaning” is what a
sentence means independent of its occasion of use.184 Kar and Radin argued
this distinction is critical for a proper identification of the scope and content
of t h e parties’ actual agreement and shared meaning of the contract.185 Stated
2016, up 15.6% over 2015, MARKETING LAND (Feb. 20, 2017), https://marketingland.com/report-e-commerce-accounted-11-7-total-retail-sales-2016-15-6-2015207088 [perma.cc/YDXV-34LF].
178. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1139.
179. Id. Shared meaning analysis does not stand for the idea that boilerplate is part
of the contract but is unenforceable for supervening reasons. Id. at 1142–43. Instead,
the authors argue that the offending terms were never part of the contract in the first
place because they are not within the bounds of the parties’ actual agreement. Id. at
1210–12. Accordingly, the authors’ legal theory for addressing unenforceable boilerplate is not reformation, where a party seeks a contract adjustment to ameliorate a mistake or fraud and neither is it severance, where a party seeks to remove illegal terms,
such as those that offend public policy. CIGNA Corp. v. Amara, 563 U.S. 421, 440–41
(2011) (explaining reformation); 8 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD,
WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 19:70 (4th ed. 2019) (explaining severance).
180. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1140.
181. Id. at 1143, 1161, 1173 (criticizing Hill v. Gateway, 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147
(7th Cir. 1997)).
182. Id. at 1143, 1146, 1160, 1167, 1216 (adding qualification that the presupposition holds “even if one party was not acting fully cooperatively so long as the
presupposition was warranted”).
183. Id. at 1145–46.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 1165.
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differently, “speaker meaning” is what a speaker intends to convey to another
person within an interpersonal conversation, which often depends upon
both parties relying on implicit presuppositions of linguistic cooperation to
form a contract. Simply put, for Kar and Radin, a contract formed through
actual agreement exists when the individual speaker meanings unite to form a
shared meaning.186 The authors’ argument lacks legal force as described below.

A. The Goals and Components of Shared Meaning Analysis
In their focus on doctrine, Kar and Radin contended that an incremental
but relentless “paradigm slip” in the principles of contractual obligation has
gone from (a) seller and buyer mutual consent to (b) assent by the buyer as the
party to be charged to (c) the buyer’s fictional/constructive/hypothetical assent,
and then to (d) the purchaser’s mere fictional or constructive notice of the
terms.187 Kar and Radin argued that consumer contracting has become an intolerable system of “pseudo-contract” where sellers impose private obligations
upon consumers without a supporting “actual agreement.”188
The authors said pseudo-contract distorts core contract law concepts, such
as “assent,” “agreement,” and “contract.”189 While the authors acknowledged
186. Id. at 1139. “By using language to make offers and acceptances, the two
[parties] have formed a contract, which includes a shared meaning to which both
parties have actually agreed.” Id.
187. Id. at 1139–40. Regarding the dilution of assent, the authors cite no cases
establishing that the law has proceeded in the linear manner as described above.
188. Id. at 1160–1161. Throughout their article, the authors compare modern day
boilerplate contracts with an 1883 logging contract agreement based on a Minnesota
Supreme Court decision, Thompson v. Libby. 26 N.W 1 (Minn. 1885); see e.g., Kar &
Radin, supra note 4, at 1139, 1180. The facts in the authors’ example were that a
builder and a logger agreed that if the logger “[w]ould give me all your logs marked
H.C.A, cut from the last two winters, [t]he builder would] pay [him] ten dollars per
thousand feet, boomscale at Minneapolis, Minnesota.” Id. at 1139. The authors’ reliance on this logging contract is unpersuasive because the logging contract reflects a
similar, if not a greater, incidence of gaps and omissions:
[A] superficial comparison between the two templates of a deal is incorrect.
In fact, both deals are similarly complex, and in both deals people harbor
just as much “sheer ignorance.” In general, the complexity of the contract,
and the resulting level of ignorance, has nothing to do with the boilerplate
scheme. The ordinary contracts from the romantic era of pre-boilerplate . .
. are surprisingly complex and sometimes leave more uncertainty than the
thick boilerplate of the mass-contract era.
Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 MICH. L. REV.
883, 887 (2014).
189. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1140. The idea that standard form contracts
differ from the common understanding of a “contract” is not new. See John J. A. Burke,
Contract as Commodity: A Nonfiction Approach, 24 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 285, 308
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that “Boilerplate is not in and of itself pseudo-contract,”190 they still maintained that “ [ a] great deal of contemporary boilerplate text has become
pseudo-contractual.”191 As prime examples of this type of boilerplate, the authors slammed clickwrap contracts – such as Apple’s iTunes licensing service
– and contracts specifying mandatory arbitration – such as contracts subject to
the Federal Arbitration Act.192 By comparison, Kar and Radin insisted that the
essence of contract is where the parties cooperatively communicate their shared
meaning, excluding the unread – and frequently unreadable – boilerplate.193
Accordingly, the authors contended that boilerplate text that was never cooperatively communicated between the parties cannot contribute to a shared
meaning of the parties. Kar and Radin said the same is true for boilerplate
where it is merely “informational (fact-stating)” and creates no contractual
commitments.194
The authors’ position that boilerplate must be more than just physically
included in the text but must be co-operatively communicated to form an enforceable agreement lacks support.195 Where parties bind themselves to a contract that appears regular on its face and contains boilerplate, a prima facie case
exists that the parties have an actual agreement on all terms, even in the sense
used by Kar and Radin.196 By their signatures – or other conduct manifesting
assent – both parties have united in producing and approving a single document

(2000) (stating “[A] standard form contract is not a contract as that word is normally
understood”); Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 144–47,
155 (1970) (because no real bargaining occurs over standard form contract terms, these
instruments are best understood as “things” – that is, as part of the product being sold).
190. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1155.
191. Id. at 1155, 1182 (high end boilerplate contracts between sophisticated parties
are frequently contractual).
192. Id. at 1203–04, 1208.
193. Id. at 1139–40, 1155–56.
194. Id. at 1163. The authors are unduly broad in their definition of mere informational terms. They quote ten examples of boilerplate sentences from iTunes' online
“terms and conditions,” which they say merely convey information, i.e., they are just
fact-stating. Id. at 1162, 1219 n. 82. But consider the following hypothetical: One
provision from the iTunes listing states, “If you turn off automatic renewal, [then]
you will continue to have access to the Apple Service for the remainder of your
Apple Music Subscription term.” Id. at 1219 n. 82. Contrary to the authors’ assertion,
if Apple stopped access after the customer turned off the automatic renewal before term
cessation, the quoted language does implicitly create a substantive contractual right in
the customer and a substantive contractual obligation in the service provider regarding
the service. See Fed. Ins. Co. v. Winters, 354 S.W.3d 287, 291 (Tenn. 2011) (“In addition to the explicit terms, contracts may be accompanied by implied duties, which can
result in a breach.”).
195. Id. at 1163–64.
196. See PLAINTIFF'S PROOF PRIMA FACIE CASE § 2:9 (West 2019).
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containing the entire scope of their agreement, including the contract’s boilerplate.197 Moreover, where parties include an integration clause stating that a
contract contains all the terms of the agreement, the parties thereby concur that
every word matters regarding the parties’ full and final intent on the scope of
the agreement.198 The frequent use of integration clauses in American commerce easily defeats Kar and Radin’s thesis that where the contract contains
superfluous boilerplate, those terms generally are not part of the actual agreement.199
Because many, if not most, boilerplate contracts lack a separate clause
stating that boiler plate is enforceable, the authors’ have signaled their desire
to eliminate most forms of boilerplate as part of the American contracting system.200 From a practical stand point, the authors left unexplained how their
actual agreement/shared meaning analysis proposal for revising (they would
say clarifying) contractual assent could be implemented in the face of likely
staunch resistance from industry groups and their allies in federal and state legislatures.201 Also missing is the authors’ thoughts on the framework for a viable replacement system for the derided “assimilationist” system that could
timely assure sellers and buyers that they will have enforceable and complete
agreements in a manner agreeable to both sides.

B. Cooperation and Good Faith during Contract Formation
The authors argued that one normative objective of shared meaning analysis is that the parties are (or should be) in a “cooperative” relationship before
they enter a contract.202 The authors stated, “Contract meaning depends on an
implicit presupposition of cooperative language use to form a contract”203

197. Id.
198. See Bandera Drilling Co. v. Sledge Drilling Corp., 293 S.W.3d 867, 871–72
(Tex. App. 2009) (adopting this view of integration clauses).
199. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1155 (indicating boilerplate can become part of
the actual agreement when cooperatively communicated between the parties).
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1135. Another (unmentioned) limiting principle for “actual agreement/shared meaning” analysis is that it cannot contravene statute. Thus, the authors’
proposal is problematic because it would entail impermissible changes to Article Two
of the UCC, the sales article, which currently has no requirement for an actual agreement or a process congruent with shared meaning analysis. The UCC version does not
include the idea of an “actual agreement” as used by the authors. UCC 1-201(b)(3)
defines “agreement,” as distinguished from “contract,” to mean the “bargain of the parties in fact, as found in their language or inferred from other circumstances, including
course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of trade as provided in UCC 1-303.”
U.C.C. § 1-201 (Am. Law Inst. & Unif. Law Comm’n 1977).
202. See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1 2 1 6 .
203. Id. at 1144. The authors go on to say, “Contract meaning has always properly
depended on shared meaning in this sense . . .” Id. at 1146.
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They also commented, “Breach of the cooperative norms relating to truth can
be understood as a form of bad faith during the process of negotiation.”204
As authority for this proposition, the authors cited section 205, cmt. c. of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.205 This provision addresses the implied
contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing generally and includes one definition of “good faith” as “honesty in fact as related to the transaction” specifically.206
The authors misconstrued section 205 as being relevant in any sense to a
breach of a cooperative norm of good faith arising during contract negotiations.207 Section 205, comment c, explicitly says, “This Section, like Uniform
Commercial Code § 1-203, does not deal with good faith in the formation of a
contract.”208 Many cases are to the same effect and say Section 205 and UCC
§ 1-203 presuppose an existing valid contract.209 Although section 205 is relevant to contract modifications, Kar and Radin only invited confusion by implying this Restatement section applies across the board to contract formation.210 Consequently, the authors’ reliance on Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts was misplaced.
Apart from their questionable use of the Restatement, the authors misdescribed the extent of the cooperative “norms” and the duty of good faith and
fair dealing that exists during the negotiation stage.211 Contrary to the impression left by the authors, the pre-award version of good faith and fair dealing is
much narrower than the contractual version. In Market Street Associates Ltd.
Partnership v. Frey,212 the Seventh Circuit did not recognize a general duty for
a cooperative relationship during contract formation akin to the broad duty
advocated by Kar and Radin.213 The court said:
Before the contract is signed, the parties confront each other with a natural wariness. Neither expects the other to be particularly forthcoming,
and therefore there is no deception when one is not. Afterwards the

204. Id. at 1152.
205. Id.
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).
207. Id. at cmt. c.
208. Id. (emphasis added).
209. Courts agree, “because the existence of th[e] covenant [of good faith and fair
dealing] depends on the existence of an underlying contractual relationship, there is no
claim for a breach of this covenant where a valid contract has not yet been formed.”
Scott Timber Co. v. United States, 692 F.3d 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting
Mountain Highlands, LLC v. Hendricks, 616 F.3d 1167, 1171 (10th Cir. 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. e (1981).
211. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1154.
212. 941 F.2d 588 (7th Cir. 1991).
213. Id.
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situation is different. The parties are now in a cooperative relationship
the costs of which will be considerably reduced by a measure of trust. 214

The Seventh Circuit in Market Street made plain that before the contract
is formed the parties deal at arms’ length and the trust factor is naturally low.215
Contrary to the authors’ conclusion, a general cooperative relationship arises
only after contract execution and not beforehand.216 The Seventh Circuit then
explained how parties may take legitimate advantage of their counterpart during contract formation:
In fact, the law contemplates that people frequently will take advantage
of the ignorance of those with whom they contract, without thereby incurring liability. The duty of honesty, of good faith even expansively
conceived, is not a duty of candor. You can make a binding contract to
purchase something you know your seller undervalues. That of course
is a question about formation, not performance, and the particular duty
of good faith under examination here relates to the latter rather than to
the former.
....
The formation or negotiation stage is precontractual, and here the duty
is minimized . . . . 217

The authors cited none of these cases mentioned in this section setting a
relatively low bar for the degree of cooperation required before contract execution. Instead, Kar and Radin emphasized that parties “with equal capacities
to enter into all and only trades they actually agree will offer expected gains
for each . . . .”218 By emphasizing a co-operative process aimed at achieving
party equality, Kar and Radin would erase the advantages that merchants legitimately can have over consumers in terms of hard but fair bargaining in a free
market economy.219 The real world is not – and never will be – populated by
parties with “ equal capacities” reaching “actual agreements” to enter just
t h e trades t h a t will offer expected gains for each party.220 Cases are even

214. Id. (emphasis added).
215. Id. at 595.
216. Id. at 594.
217. Id. at 593–94 (emphasis added).
218. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1161.
219. “Hard bargaining . . . [is] acceptable, even desirable in our economic system.”
Rich & Whillock, Inc. v. Ashton Dev., Inc., 157 Cal. App. 3d 1154, 1159 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984).
220. Cf. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1161; but see Kessler, supra note 3, at 640
(“Society, when granting freedom of contract, does not guarantee that all members of
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rare that a party with a legitimate advantage would readily give it up. Courts
should leave parties where they find them in terms of their talents, abilities, and
resources; judges should not become players in renovating the existing American economy to pass into law a party’s social or economic theories.
Quite likely, merchants would object to the Kar and Radin view of cooperation that sellers should do business only with parties with “equal capacities”
and where the parties agree the trade will offer “expected gains for each
party.”221 Additionally, companies include boilerplate clauses for a definable
business reason. If a court or legislature outlawed boilerplate – which is permissible222 – firms likely would either leave that market or charge higher prices
to account for the greater risk flowing from the loss of these boilerplate clauses.
As one commentator observed,
In short, if a term is efficient, it should be enforced whether it emerges
by sheer luck from a dysfunctional market for lemons or by design from
a functioning market with robust competition and universal salience of
product features. The alternative is to allow consumers to have their
cake and eat it too-i.e., to enjoy the lower price but then escape enforcement of the term. Faced with that possibility, sellers would change the
boilerplate to allocate such risks to themselves, inefficiently, and charge
higher prices to make up for it. Such an outcome would do no favors
for seller or consumer.223

C. The Restatement (Second) and ‘Common Meaning’ of the Parties
Relying upon the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 201(1),
comment c,224 Kar and Radin posited that the traditional and “primary search”
the community will be able to make use of it to the same extent.”). For additional
discussion of freedom of contract, see Part VII.
221. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1161.
222. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1451 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Doubtless a
state could forbid the use of standard contracts . . . .”).
223. See James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH & LEE L. REV. 161, 214
(2013); see also Wayne R. Barnes, Toward a Fairer Model of Consumer Assent to
Standard Form Contracts: In Defense of Restatement Subsection 211(3), 82 WASH. L.
REV. 227, 236 (2007) (“Businesses use these forms to insert clauses which reduce or
eliminate a myriad of risks. By reducing risks, businesses using standard forms are
able to reduce prices charged for goods and services. The prevalent use of standard
form contracts is indicative of their near-indispensability to commerce.”).
224. Section 201(1) states, “Where the parties have attached the same meaning to a
promise or agreement or a term thereof, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981). Cmt. c provides:
Subsection (1) makes it clear that the primary search is for a common meaning of the parties, not a meaning imposed on them by the law. To the extent
that a mutual understanding is displaced by government regulation, the resulting obligation does not rest on “interpretation” in the sense used here.
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in contract interpretation is to identify the “common” (or “shared”) meaning of
the parties.225 As discussed below, the authors’ argument was not persuasive.
Despite the Restatement’s comment about the search for the common
meaning of the parties, Kar and Radin supported their case with a section of
the Restatement that is misleading at best.226 The current Williston treatise
cogently summarized the status of the Restatement’s “common meaning” principle of Section 201(1) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts:
[I]t will indeed be a rare instance when it is appropriate to apply the
subjective, mutual standard, for it involves the situation in which both
or all the parties to the contract attach the same meaning to words, yet
nevertheless some dispute has reached the courts. It is therefore not too
surprising that most of the cases invoking the mutual standard of the
Restatement Second [Section 201] do so either by way of dictum, with
the court actually applying some other, typically objective, standard; or
do so without much in the way of analysis, the appellate court merely
indicating its affirmance of the trial court; or finally, do so in the infrequent situation in which its use is most appropriate: When the parties to
the contract agree as to the meaning of the term or agreement, but one
of the parties due to a change of circumstances or a third party . . . is
arguing for a more favorable meaning . . . .
Aside from these few situations, the courts have not discussed or applied the subjective, mutual standard. Thus, the mutual standard advocated by the Restatement Second remains a minority rule . . . .227

Read in its entirety, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section
201(1) is not – as Kar and Radin contended – the overarching principle or the
“central focus” of contractual obligation and assent.228 The most that can be

The objective of interpretation in the general law of contracts is to carry out
the understanding of the parties rather than to impose obligations on them
contrary to their understanding: “the courts do not make a contract for the
parties.”
Id. at cmt. c.
225. See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1146 n.24. Kar and Radin rely repeatedly
on the Restatement (Second) of Contracts and cite no supporting cases.
226. One commentator has noted the tendency of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in some instances to draw erroneous conclusions about the state of the law. See
W. Noel Keyes, The Restatement (Second): Its Misleading Quality and a Proposal for
Its Amelioration, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 23, 24 (1985).
227. 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §
31:14 (4th ed. 2007).
228. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1138.
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said about the “minority standard” of Section 201(1) is that it addresses an “infrequent” issue and is not the bedrock concept as advertised by Kar and Radin.229

D. The Courts and “Common Meaning” of the Parties
According to the authors, “common meaning of the parties” is the meaning the parties subjectively assign to the contract terms.230 Repeatedly, the authors highlighted the essence of contract as reflecting the parallel mental operations and understandings of the parties.231 The authors were incorrect in
stressing a subjective theory of assent.
The experience of one jurisdiction’s use of the phrase “common meaning
of the parties” proves the point. In a 2007 Delaware Court of Chancery decision, the court said, “The primary search is for the common meaning of the
parties, not a meaning imposed on them by law.”232 This passage does not
support the authors’ thesis because the court of chancery simply meant that
courts distinguish between meaning supplied by the parties or by the law. 233
The real issue becomes how does a state such as Delaware – a jurisdiction
where many large corporations are headquartered and whose state law controls
the interpretation of numerous contracts – understand “common meaning of
the parties?”
[Section 1.01] The Delaware Supreme Court has answered this question. In a 2014 decision, the high court concisely summarized the principles linking contract and common meaning . . . .
[Section 1.02] Contract terms themselves will be controlling when
they establish the parties' common meaning so that a reasonable person
in the position of either party would have no expectations inconsistent
with the contract language. Under standard rules of contract interpretation, a court must determine the intent of the parties from the language of the contract.234

229. Cf. Binder v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 89 Cal. Rptr. 2d 540, 552 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (“Almost never are all the connotations of a bargain exactly identical for both
parties”).
230. See Section IV.E (collecting references showing the authors’ reliance on the
subjective standard of assent).
231. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1163.
232. Seidensticker v. Gasparilla Inn, Inc. No. CIV.A. 255-CC, 2007 WL 4054473
at *3 n.13 (Del. Ch. Nov. 8, 2007) (quoting Klair v. Reese, 531 A.2d 219, 223 (Del.
1987)) (emphasis added).
233. Id.
234. Salamone v. Gorman, 106 A.3d 354, 368 (Del. 2014) (emphasis added); see
also In re Silverstein, 37 A.3d 382, 385 (N.H. 2012) (the parties’ intent “is determined
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Therefore, Kar and Radin were only half-right when they contended that
courts seek a common meaning. Judges do not seek common meaning of the
parties in a subjective sense but instead seek the common meaning of the words
used by the parties in an objective sense unless the agreement provides to the
contrary. Significantly, the authors cited no decisions indicating their construct
has been the dominant view for “centuries.”235 By following the minority view
of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Section 201, Kar and Radin revealed
their preference for the subjective standard over the objective standard in determining mutual assent.236 The next section will contrast and compare the two
standards and will demonstrate the superiority of the objective test for assessing
the obligations of the parties.

E. The Competing Standards of Contractual Assent: The Subjective
and Objective Theories
As stated above, the authors contended that shared meaning analysis endorses neither the objective nor the subjective theory of contractual obligation
and assent.237 This assertion cannot be accepted. When it comes to contractual
boilerplate, Kar and Radin’s article repudiated foundational principles of contract interpretation and disregarded the objective theory as it seeks to revive the
defunct subjective theory of assent as the general basis for contractual obligation.238
Their article contains numerous legal conclusions based on the consumer's “actual agreement,” or “knowing assent.”239 The quoted terms relate to the

from the agreement taken as a whole, and by construing its terms according to the common meaning of their words and phrases.”) (emphasis added); Grosse Pointe Park v.
Mich. Mun. Liab. and Prop. Pool, 702 N.W.2d 106, 124 (Mich. 2005) (“The law presumes that the contracting parties' intent is embodied in the actual words used in the
contract itself. A rule to the contrary would reward imprecision in the drafting of contracts.”); 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §
30:1 (4th ed. 2019) (contract interpretation “is the ascertainment of [a contract's] meaning by determining the meaning of the words employed.”).
235. See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1140, 1154.
236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981).
237. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1143 n.18, 1160.
238. Id.
239. Kar and Radin mention “actual agreement” 78 times and the equivalent concept “knowing assent” three times. See Kar & Radin, supra note 4. “Knowing consent”
requires subjective agreement with the course of action. Knowing Consent, BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). A commentator notes that imposing a knowing consent standard could “require proof not only that the consumer knew there was a [particular] clause in the contract, but that the consumer read and understood the clause.”
Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses, Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual
Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 167, 175 (2004). Accept-
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offeror's personal state of mind and his subjective understandings.240 In essence, Kar and Radin said that shared meaning exists where parties have parallel speaker meaning.241 Unfortunately, Kar and Radin devoted just a few
sentences to explaining the objective and subjective theories of mutual assent,
even though the choice of doctrine would decide the viability of boilerplate as
a feature of the contracting system.242 Thus, my discussion will comprehensively compare the two schools of thought.
Kar and Radin’s proposal asserted that there must be an “actual” agreement, and it is apparent that this adjective qualifies the concept of an “agreement.” The authors did not specifically discuss the meaning of “actual,” but
the dictionary definition is clear enough.243 I agree with Randy Barnett who
stated that “actual” consent means “subjective” consent.244
Regarding the determination of contractual assent, the true test is not what
the parties to the contract intended it to mean from a subjective viewpoint but
what intent the parties manifested from an objectively verifiable perspective.245
The objective test theory of assent comes in two variations, literalism – the
majority view – and contextualism.
First, under literalism, “[a] cardinal rule of contractual interpretation is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties. [Courts] determine the
parties' intent by examining the plain and ordinary meaning of the written
words from the contract document. If the language is clear and unambiguous,
the literal meaning of the contract language controls.” 246
Second, under contextualism, parties' intentions are to be determined
from the four corners of the contract when the contract is clear and unambiguous.247 However, even when the agreement is unambiguous, the court may
“consider the situation of the parties and the accompanying circumstances at

ing this knowing consent standard also would undermine the duty to read and understand the contract where a consumer argues he did not read or understand the boilerplate. See infra Section VIII.
240. See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1154.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Actual, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/browse/actual (last
visited June 30, 2019) [perma.cc/XW6J-77RJ] (“actual” means “existing in fact” or
“real”).
244. Barnett, supra note 3, at 629.
245. Id. at 635.
246. Allmand v. Pavletic, 292 S.W.3d 618, 630 (Tenn. 2009) (citations omitted);
Employers Ins. of Wausau v. Constr. Mgmt. Eng’rs of Fla., Inc., 377 S.E.2d 119, 121
(S.C. Ct. App. 1989).
247. Hamblen Cty. v. Morristown, 656 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tenn. 1983).
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the time it was entered into, not for the purpose of modifying or enlarging or
curtailing its terms, but to aid in determining the contract's meaning.”248
In various decisions, courts have considered the standards under the rubric of “objective” standard of interpretation.249 Courts also have applied the
objective theory to standard form contracts.250

1. The Objective Theory Further Explained
Under the objective theory, “a contracting party is generally bound by the
apparent intention he outwardly manifests to the other contracting party.”251
Courts have said, “The only intent of the parties to a contract which is essential
is an intent to say the words and do the acts which constitute their manifestation
of assent.”252 To the extent that a party’s real but secret intention differs from
the contract terms, it is “entirely immaterial.”253
The most common way parties express this intent is to sign the contract,
but a court might deem a party equally bound by his other words and actions

248. Id. at 334 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 235 (1932)); Bokor
v. Holder, 722 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986). This definition of contextualism defeats any argument that courts are unconcerned with speaker meaning.
249. See City Investing Co. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 624 A.2d 1191, 1198 (Del.1993);
Myers v. Myers, 408 A.2d 279, 281 (Del.1979) (where a contract is clear on its face,
the Court should rely solely on the clear, literal meaning of the words as they would be
understood by an objective reasonable third party); Brown Bros. Elec. Contractors, Inc.
v. Beam Constr. Corp., 361 N.E.2d 999, 1001 (N.Y. 1997) (courts rely on the “objective
manifestations” of the parties as expressed by the contract terms and “attendant” circumstances).
250. E.g., Amco Ins. Co. v. Haht, 490 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Iowa 1992) (applying the
objective standard to an insurance policy, which is a contract of adhesion); Amera-Seiki
Corp. v. Cincinnati Ins. Co., 721 F.3d 582, 585 (8th Cir. 2013).
251. Janssen Biotech, Inc. v. Celltrion Healthcare Co., 296 F. Supp. 3d 336, 342
(D. Mass. 2017).
252. Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 190 (D.C. App. 2009).
253. In re McLean Indus., Inc., 90 B.R. 614, 621 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988) (quoting
Cohn v. Fisher, 287 A.2d 222, 224 (N.J. Super. Div. 1972)). In Skycom Corp. v. Telstar
Corp., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained the policy against
the recognition of secret intent:
The objective approach is an essential ingredient to allowing the parties
jointly to control the effect of their document. If unilateral or secret intents
could bind, parties would become wary, and the written word would lose
some of its power. The ability to fix the consequences with certainty is especially important in commercial transactions that are planned with care in
advance.
813 F.2d 810, 815 (7th Cir. 1987).
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signifying agreement.254 Thus, the law does not demand that the parties had
“[h]armonious intentions or states of mind.”255 Citing a famous law review
article by Oliver Wendell Holmes, the Florida Supreme Court concisely summarized the applicable law: “The making of a contract depends not on the
agreement of two minds in one intention, but on the agreement of two sets of
external signs – not the parties having meant the same thing but on their having
said the same thing.”256
As indicated by the above observation from the Florida Supreme Court,
evidentiary concerns explain the pre-eminence of the objective standard.257 In
a frequently cited opinion, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit commented in Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Business Credit, Inc.,258
It would be helpful if judges were psychics who could delve into the
parties' minds to ascertain their original intent. However, courts neither
claim nor possess psychic power. Therefore, in order to interpret contracts with some consistency, and in order to provide contracting parties
with a legal framework which provides a measure of predictability, the
courts must eschew the ideal of ascertaining the parties' subjective intent and instead bind parties by the objective manifestations of their intent.259

2. When Consumers Click “I Agree” – An Ambiguous Action?
In a key unexamined issue, Kar and Radin did not address whether a merchant would be justified in concluding that the buyer who clicks the “I agree”
button in an online computer contractual transaction is necessarily manifesting
binding assent. Where the merchant sufficiently discloses the terms of an offer
to the offeree, the consumer's clicking “I agree” is the consumer's unambiguous, voluntary, and affirmative act of assent that equates to a signature. It
should not be required for the consumer here to make an online statement to
the effect that “I consent – and I really mean it.”
As one commentator observed:

254. See Newkirk v. Vill. of Steger 536 F.3d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 2008); D’Antuono
v. Serv. Rd. Corp., 789 F. Supp. 2d 308, 323 (D. Conn. 2011) (signature usually conclusive evidence of consent); Wash. Greensview Apartment Assoc. v. Travelers Prop.
Cas. Co., 295 P.3d 284, 292 (Wash. Ct. App. 2013).
255. Devlin v. Ingrum, 928 F.2d 1084, 1095 (11th Cir. 1991) (citing Lilley v. Gonzales, 417 So. 2d 161, 163 (Ala. 1982)).
256. Gendzier v. Bielecki, 97 So. 2d 604, 608 (Fla. 1957) (citing Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 464 (1897)).
257. Id. at 608.
258. 619 F.2d 1001 (3d Cir. 1980).
259. Id. at 1009.
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Many courts . . . have found the act of clicking an “I agree” button
to be an express manifestation of assent to contract terms. Some
opinions have said so explicitly, while others seem to assume without discussion that when an offeree is required to click the “I agree”
button, she knows that she is entering into a contract.260

For instance, when the consumer tenders this “explicit acceptance” of a
software license agreement, numerous courts properly indicate that this conduct raises no contestable issues of fact upon a motion for summary judgment.261 An exception would be where a consumer – the offeree – clicks the
“I agree” button would not manifest assent to contractual terms in the relatively
infrequent circumstance where the seller's offer fails to inform the consumer
that this action would signify assent to the terms or where the consumer’s response both affirms and contradicts the manifestation of assent.
In contrast with Kar and Radin, Randy Barnett has offered a powerful
legal argument on why the consumer's clicking “I agree” satisfies the manifested assent element under the objective theory and the plain meaning rule:
When one clicks “I agree” to the terms on the box, does one usually
know what one is doing? Absolutely. There is no doubt whatsoever
that one is objectively manifesting one's assent to the terms in the box,
whether or not one has read them. The same observation applies to
signatures on form contracts. Clicking the button that says, “I agree,”
no less than signing one's name on the dotted line, indicates unambiguously: I agree to be legally bound by the terms in this agreement.

If consent to be legally bound is the basis of contractual enforcement,
rather than the making of a promise, then consent to be legally bound seems to
exist objectively. Even under the modern objective theory, there is no reason
for the other party to believe that such subjective consent is lacking. Even if
one does not want to be bound, one knows that the other party will take this
conduct as indicating consent to be bound thereby.262

3. The Policy of the Objective Theory
Kar and Radin did not discuss in any depth the policy for the objective
theory. Understanding its rationale clarifies why this doctrine has succeeded
as the prevailing mode for ascertaining the existence of mutual assent even for
standardized or boilerplate agreements.
260. Juliet M. Moringiello, Signals, Assent and Internet Contracting, 57 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1307, 1323–24 (2005).
261. See i.Lan Sys. v. Netscout Serv. Level Corp., 183 F. Supp. 2d 328, 338 (D.
Mass. 2002); see also Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y.
2012).
262. Barnett, supra note 3, at 635.
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The objective test protects the “fundamental principle” of the security of
contracting actions as it maintains a “[w]orkable system of commerce and economic exchange.”263 The goal of the objective test is that by requiring evidence
beyond litigation-motivated, post hoc descriptions of the parties' earlier states
of mind, the judicial system increases the reliability of its decision-making process.264 A related policy is that the objective test allows the first party to have
little or no reason to fear that the second party may thereafter void the contract
by his claiming either a failure to read or a subjective misunderstanding of the
agreement.265
As Grant Gilmore opined,
[I]f “the actual state of the party’s minds” is relevant, then each
litigated case must become an extended factual inquiry into what
was “intended,” “meant,” “believed” and so on. If, however, we
can restrict ourselves to the “externals” . . . then the factual inquiry
will be much simplified and in time can be dispensed with altogether as the courts accumulate precedent about recurring types of
permissible and impermissible “conduct.”266

Because it emphasizes external, ascertainable events regarding the deal,
the objective test upholds the value of unbiased adjudication and readily captures the parties’ manifested intent before a dispute arises between the parties.267
The root cause of the authors’ detour from prevailing law was that Kar
and Radin overlooked the nature of contract as expounded by Learned Hand in
a 1911 case still cited regularly in the 21st century:
A contract has, strictly speaking, nothing to do with the personal, or
individual, intent of the parties. A contract is an obligation attached by
the mere force of law to certain acts of the parties, usually words, which
ordinarily accompany and represent a known intent. If, however, if it
were proved by twenty bishops that either party, when he used the
263. Wayne Barnes, The Objective Theory of Contracts, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1119,
1129 (2008).
264. Solan, supra note 70, at 380.
265. Allied Office Supplies Inc. v. Lewandowski, 261 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112 (D.
Conn. 2003); see also SR Int’l. Bus. Ins. Co., v. World Trade Center Props., LLC, 467
F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2006); Dugan v. Brunswick Sewerage Co., 142 F.3d 398 (7th Cir.
1998) (subjective evidence made through the testimony by a party on the meaning of a
contract is invariably self-serving and inherently difficult to verify); Apeldyn Corp. v.
Eidos, LLC, 943 F. Supp. 2d. 1145, 1149 (D. Or. 2013) (statements of a party’s subjective intent that were not expressed or communicated when the contract was formed are
not permissible evidence of intent).
266. GRANT GILMORE, DEATH OF CONTRACT 47 (2d ed. 1995).
267. Id.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss3/7

44

Feldman: Actual Agreement, Shared Meaning Analysis, and the Invalidation o

2019]

BOILERPLATE INVALIDATION

755

words, intended something else than the usual meaning which the law
imposes upon them, he would still be held, unless there were some mutual mistake, or something else of the sort. Of course, if it appears by
other words, or acts, of the parties, that they attribute a peculiar meaning
to such words as they use in the contract, that meaning will prevail, but
only by virtue of the other words, and not because of their unexpressed
intent.
....
Yet the question always remains for the court to interpret the reasonable
meaning to the acts of the parties, by word or deed, and no characterization of its effect by either party thereafter, however truthful, is material. The rights and obligations depend upon the law alone.268

As Professor Lawrence A. Solan commented, Judge Hand rejected the
inherently unreliable party testimony about an intent that the party never manifested in contemporaneous – and verifiable – fashion to the opposing party
during contract formation.269 Indeed, under the strict or literal version of the
objective theory, the courts examining mutual assent are generally limited in
their evidentiary scope of review to the four corners of an unambiguous document.270 These decisions further exemplify the strong connection between the
objective theory, the plain meaning rule, and the nature of contract (per Judge
Hand).
Finally, the objective theory of contracts comports with the need and reason for voluntary assent.271 The rule preserves individual autonomy because
the coercive power of the state allows the parties to exercise their personal
freedom with the result that “[c]onsent is the human vehicle for exercising freedom or autonomy.”272 Also, the objective doctrine enhances the freedom of
contract because the law allows parties the increased ability to manage their
business relationships “[b]y limiting operative manifestations to those that are
268. Hotchkiss v. Nat’l City Bank of N.Y., 200 F. 287, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1911) (emphasis added); Chesapeake Energy Corp. v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., N.A., 773
F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2014); Galvin v. EMC Mortg. Corp., 27 F. Supp. 3d 224, 230
(D.N.H. 2014); see also Grosse Pointe Park v. Mich. Mun. Liab. and Prop. Pool, 702
N.W.2d 106, 123 (Mich. 2005) (“[I]t is during litigation that a party’s motivations are
the most suspect and the party’s incentives the greatest to attempt to achieve that which
the party could not during the give-and-take of the contract negotiation process.”).
269. Solan, supra note 70, at 379–80.
270. “[T]he objective theory of contracts . . . limits the court to the four corners of
[a clear and definite] contract in determining the intention of the parties.” In re Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc., 240 B.R. 711, 722 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1999) (quoting Cloverland
Farms Dairy, Inc. v. Fry, 587 A.2d 527, 529–30 (Md. 1991)) (calling this position “the
majority view”).
271. Barnes, supra note 263, at 1154.
272. Id. at 1129.
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received and known by the parties to the negotiation.”273 Lastly, it protects the
parties’ reliance and expectation interests.274 Regrettably, Kar and Radin mentioned none of these salutary principles in their article.

F. The Subjective Theory Compared
The main reason for the demise of the subjective theory was that courts
“[r]efuse to inquire into the subjective mental processes of each of the parties
to a contract, except in the most compelling circumstances.”275 As Judge Frank
Easterbrook said in a colorful way, “Yet [contract] ‘intent’ does not invite a
tour through [a party's] cranium, with [that party] as the guide.”276 Another risk
is that reliance on the subjective test could create what one commentator called
a “de facto option” in the promisor. As Randy Barnett stated: “Such a strategy
might create a de facto option in the promisor. The promisor could insist on
enforcement if the contract continued to be in her interest, but if it were no
longer advantageous, she could avoid the contract by producing evidence of a
differing subjective intent.”277 Because the subjective approach relies on evidence directly inaccessible to the other party, much less to third parties, broad
judicial consideration of subjective intent would undermine the security of
transactions by greatly reducing the reliability of contractual commitments.”278
For many decades, “[t]he controversy has been resolved. Contract law abandoned the theory of subjective intention as unworkable.”279
In arguing that the boilerplate in most standard form contracts does not
lead to actual assent, Kar and Radin’s argument led inexorably to the conclusion that they endorsed the subjective view of contractual assent with respect
to boilerplate. In a commentary directly on point for this issue, Randy Barnett
stated,
273. Id. at 1131.
274. Id. at 1157.
275. While the subjective theory as a general doctrine of assent no longer prevails,
vestiges have survived. One qualification is “The subjective meaning attached by either
party to a form of words is not controlling on the scope of the agreement between the
parties unless one party knows or has reason to know of a particular meaning attached
by the party manifesting assent.” Brokers Title Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.,
610 F.2d 1174, 1181 (3d Cir. 1979).
276. Skycom Corp. v. Telstar Corp., 813 F.2d 810, 814 (7th Cir. 1987). The court
further observed: “Secret hopes and wishes count for nothing. The status of a document
as a contract depends on what the parties express to each other and to the world, not on
what they keep to themselves.” Id. at 814–15.
277. Randy Barnett, Contract is not Promise; Contract is Consent, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW, 45–46 (Gregory Klass et al., eds
2014).
278. Id.
279. JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 30, at 61–64 (4th ed.
2001).
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[I]f a subjective view of contractual assent is taken, then form contracts
pose a very serious problem. If a person must consciously have had the
particular terms in mind when signifying agreement to them, then most
terms in most form contracts lack assent. Most people fail to read most
terms most of the time and no person can credibly claim to read all of
the terms in form contracts all of the time . . . Hence the problem: How
can someone be said to have “actually”– meaning subjectively – consented to terms of which one was completely unaware? To impute subjective assent to the person indicating consent to a form is obviously to
engage in a fiction. Under a subjective theory of contractual assent,
very few, if any, of the terms in a form contract would be assented to.280

Barnett repeatedly notes that “actual” consent specifically means “subjective” assent to boilerplate.281 Because a pillar of shared meaning analysis is an
“actual agreement,” which was the linchpin of their thesis, Kar and Radin fully
embraced the “unworkable” subjective theory as the foundation for their proposal.

G. How Much Sharing is Needed for Shared Meaning?
The next flaw in the authors’ “shared meaning” doctrine conflicts with
the principle that “[c]ourts must give effect to the manifest intent of the parties
as it existed at the time of contract formation.”282 Unfortunately, no objective
way exists for the parties to know ex ante what terms a court ex post would rule
constitutes the actual agreement versus the “ride along” text. Under the authors’ shared meaning analysis, as critiqued above, Kar and Radin run headlong
against the reality that “[o]nly rarely can one party show that the meaning that
it asserts at the time of the dispute was shared by both parties at the time the
contract was made.” 283 The parties will know for sure which clauses are either
part of the actual agreement or ride along terms only by the settlement or after
the conclusion of litigation, which is costly and time-consuming. Accordingly,
under a shared meaning analysis regime, boilerplate contracts from the moment
of formation would exist under a cloud of uncertainty over which terms are
judicially enforceable, which would further impair the predictability and reliability of contractual relationships. Kar and Radin did not examine this flaw in
their theory.

280. Barnett, supra note 3, at 626–29.
281. Id.
282. Associated Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Ruff, 424 P.3d 571, 586 (Mont. 2018); Thor
Seafood Corp. v. Supply Mgmt. Servs., 352 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1131 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
283. 2 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7.9 (3d ed. 2004);
see also Baladevon, Inc. v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 871 F. Supp. 89 (D. Mass. 1994).
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Nevertheless, the authors indicated that sufficient common meaning either exists between the parties or can usually be unearthed upon diligent review.284 Contrary to the impression left by Kar and Radin about a discoverable
common meaning, it bears repeating that “[i]n practice, only rarely can one
party show that the meaning that it asserts at the time of the dispute was shared
by both parties at the time the contract was made.”285 In fact, the chances of
parties sharing the same interpretation of a particular issue are very low because contracts are structurally incapable of addressing the myriad circumstances that can arise. Professors Coyle and Wedemaier commented:
Everyone knows that contracts are incomplete, in that they do not describe and discount “all relevant future contingencies . . . with respect
to both likelihood and futurity.” One reason for incompleteness is that
parties do not have complete presentation. Even if this were not so –
that is, even if parties could assign a probability and value to all possible
future states of the world – it would be prohibitively costly to negotiate
and draft a contract covering such an infinitude of possibilities.286

The above conclusion raises another issue under shared meaning analysis;
namely, once a court deletes the non-binding boilerplate, are the admissible
portions of the contract sufficient to constitute a binding contract? According
to Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 33(2), the general rule is that a contract
is sufficiently definite and certain to be enforceable where, based upon the
agreement's terms, the rules of construction, and principles of equity, a court
can ascertain what the parties have agreed to do.287 Whether these terms are
sufficiently definite is a different inquiry than what terms the parties considered
material and essential to that agreement. In considering enforceability, the
court may opine that striking these terms could leave the parties with an inadequate shell of a contract if the application of shared meaning analysis eradicates essential terms.288
The authors’ suggestion that courts may routinely excise ride-along terms
as being non-consensual runs counter to fundamental polices that courts do not
ignore or delete contract terms except for strong reasons. Thus, the settled rule
is courts prefer an interpretation that gives reasonable meaning to all provisions
to one that leaves a portion of the agreement useless, meaningless, without

284. See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1165.
285. See supra note 283 and accompanying text.
286. John F. Coyle & W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Interpreting Contracts Without
Context, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1673, 1677 (2018).
287. Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v. Campbell, 187 A.3d 1209, 1232 (Del. 2018).
288. See Best Brands Beverage, Inc. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 842 F.2d 578, 587–
88 (2d Cir. 1998) (stating, “if the terms of the agreement are so vague and indefinite
that there is no basis or standard for deciding whether the agreement has been kept or
broken . . . then there is no enforceable contract”).
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force and effect, or inexplicable.289 No term – including boilerplate terms –
should be rejected as surplusage if the court in examining the whole instrument
can discover a reasonable purpose for the words.290 These last mentioned principles alone would be a strong reason for a court to reject shared meaning analysis and its treatment of boilerplate. In a ruling especially damaging to Kar
and Radin’s thesis, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts observed, “All parts of a contract are to be given effect, whether ‘boilerplate’ or not.”291
Further, courts are to “assume that the parties intended that a binding contract be formed,” and “[t]hus, any choice of alternative interpretations, with one
interpretation saving the contract and the other voiding it, should be resolved
in favor of the interpretation that saves the contract.”292 Considering that Kar
and Radin’s apparent objective was to void most or all boilerplate contracts,
with the inevitable impact of leaving the U.S economy in distress, courts should
strive to enforce these contracts to the greatest extent possible.

H. The Ramifications of Shared Meaning Analysis
Because 99% of all contracts are consumer/vendor boilerplate transactions, 293 if Kar and Radin’s approach to reforming boilerplate was first implemented on a limited basis and studied, a likely ramification would be a skyrocketing in transaction costs of contracting – and of the prices of most goods
289. Hunt Constr. Group, Inc. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 456, 459 (Fed. Cl. 2001),
aff’d, 281 F.3d 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Bombay Realty Corp. v. Magna Carta, Inc., 790
N.E.2d 1163, 1165 (N.Y. 2003); cf. Robinson v. Tate, 236 S.W.2d 445, 450 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1950) (courts should make a reasonable construction of a contract and should not
“deliberately emasculate” the agreement).
290. 17A AM. JUR. 2d CONTRACTS § 387 (1991); see also Eastman Kodak Co. v.
STWB Inc., 232 F. Supp. 2d 74, 92 (S.D. N.Y. 2002) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 203(a) (1981)).
291. Girardi Distributors, Inc. v. Truck Drivers Union, Local 170 Intern. Broth. of
Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Am., 1989 WL 200979 (D.
Mass. June 15, 1989) (also stating “Many contracts are pre-printed standard forms, i.e.,
all boilerplate. Try telling your mortgagee that its note and mortgage are unenforceable
because they are ‘boilerplate’”); Pietroske, Inc. v. Globalcom, Inc., 685 N.W.2d 884,
888 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (“[T]he fact that the service agreement is a boilerplate contract does not prevent a true meeting of the minds.”). For other cases stating without
qualification that boilerplate terms can be binding, see, e.g., JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A. v. Winget, 602 Fed. Appx. 246 (6th Cir. 2015); Albany Ins. Co. v. MV SEALAND
URUGUAY, No. 00CIV.3497 2002 WL 1870289 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2002); Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sharp, 940 F. Supp. 3d 569, 577 (N.D. Ohio 2013).
292. Stevens Aviation, Inc. v. DynCorp Int’l LLC, 756 S.E.2d 148, 153 (S.C. 2014).
293. Stephen J. Ware, Comment, A Critique of The Reasonable Expectations Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1461, 1463 (1989) (citing W. David Slawson, Standard Form
Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529
(1971)).
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and services. The length of contracts would necessarily double or triple, and
the time needed to enter contracts could be indeterminable until such time that
merchants and consumers could validate an “actual agreement.”
Such a pilot study also would likely provide important evidence that,
given the breadth and depth of the effects of shared meaning analysis, the
chances are very high that the authors’ proposal would fall victim, in whole or
in part, to unforeseen effects pursuant to the law of unintended consequences:
The law of unintended consequences is a frequently-observed phenomenon in which any action has results that are not part of the actor's purpose. The superfluous consequences may or may not be foreseeable or
even immediately observable and they may be beneficial, harmful or
neutral in their impact. In the best-case scenario, an action produces
both the desired results and unplanned benefits; in the worst-case scenario, however, the desired results fail to materialize and there are negative consequences that make the original problem worse. 294

Such adverse outcomes are increasingly likely to occur when a deceptively simple solution – such as shared meaning analysis – seeks to regulate the
highly complex world of commercial purchasing.295 Nevertheless, without any
evidence, the authors confidently proclaimed, “Not enforcing these pseudocontract provisions will not only help return contract regimes to the core
of private ordering but it will also help produce more efficient markets.”296 How Kar and Radin reached this conclusion is unclear, but as
pointed out elsewhere in this Article, Kar and Radin subscribe to the romantic myth that contracts with minimal content necessarily lead to superior results.297 This reasoning is errant because “ordinary contracts from the
romantic era of pre-boilerplate . . . are surprisingly complex and sometimes
leave more uncertainty than the thick boilerplate of the mass-contract era.”298
The final problem is that, from a practical standpoint, courts are naturally
going to resist adopting a theory that 99% of all consumer contracts in the
294. Margaret Rouse, Law of Unintended Consequences, WHATIS.COM (Feb.
2016),
https://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/law-of-unintended-consequences
[perma.cc/AX3Y-W7WC].
295. See In re Schwartz, 461 B.R. 93, 98 n.4 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011) (noting similar
observation about the typical impact of the law of unintended consequences).
296. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1179–80, n.127. The authors also observe,
“Shared meaning analysis offers courts a general and flexible way to avoid legal errors
that can result from failures to recognize and eliminate hidden conflicts.” Id. at 1192.
Kar and Radin set up a false dilemma when discussing the resolution of conflicts between the actual agreement and the ride-along text. Put another way, there can never
be a conflict between the actual agreement and ride along terms when the latter have
no salience of any kind to the agreement.
297. Id. at 1180 (giving an example of a “short and clear” timber sales contract in
rural Minnesota from 1885).
298. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
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United States might not be enforceable in whole or in part because of the lack
of shared meaning.299 The common law generally prefers incremental changes
to doctrine as compared to demolishing one legal regime and replacing it with
another. Based on the many concerns discussed above, the wholesale application of shared meaning analysis would disturb the rights and responsibilities
the parties allocated at contract formation and increase the unpredictability and
uncertainty of contractual relations – which would contradict two of contract
law’s most important normative goals.300

VI. SHARED MEANING ANALYSIS AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
Kar and Radin argued that the current system deprives consumers of their
freedom of contract.301 They also contended that shared meaning analysis does
not interfere with the established principles of freedom of contract but facilitates economic liberty because the parties are able to execute the actual agreement.302 Before delving into the authors’ argument, this Section will summarize the established elements of freedom of contract.

A. General Principles of Freedom of Contract
“Freedom of contract” is a fundamental aspect of American commerce.
The doctrine represents a party's “power to decide whether to contract and to
establish the [contract] terms.”303 Many courts have commented:
[I]f there is one thing which more than another public policy requires it
is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their contracts, when entered into
freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred, and shall be enforced by
courts of justice. Therefore, you have this paramount public policy to

299. See Eric A. Zacks, The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211: Unfulfilled
Expectations and the Future of Modern Standardized Consumer Contracts, 7 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 733, 733 (2016) (“judges historically have been reluctant to disturb
standardized consumer contracts, regardless of the applicable doctrine”).
300. See Anthony J. Bellia, Jr., Contracting with Electronic Agents, 50 EMORY L.J.
1047, 1073 (2001) (noting these two normative bases of contract).
301. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1214 (“Because of these conceptual distortions
[in current law], many legal actors, as well as the public, have begun to lose track of
what contract and freedom of contract even are.”).
302. Id. at 1138. (“Without the presence of an actual agreement freely reached,
the state is not easily justified in enforcing a contract, because instead of enhancing
the parties’ freedom of contract, the legal system would be limiting it.”).
303. Carolyn Edwards, Freedom of Contract and Fundamental Fairness for Individual Parties: The Tug of War Continues, 77 UMKC L. REV. 647, 654 (2009).
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consider,[] that you are not lightly to interfere with this freedom of contract.304

Freedom of contract balances party autonomy and party accountability.
First, with the autonomy component, parties have the right to bind themselves
legally; it is a judicial concept that contracts are based on mutual agreement
and free choice.305 Importantly, parties may exercise their liberty to contract
even if the agreement “may not seem desirable or pleasant to outside observers
[such as law professors].”306 Second, under the accountability component, parties must accept the consequences of their voluntary choices. The general rule
of freedom of contract includes the need for a party to accept a possible bad
bargain without court interference or paternalism.307
To accomplish this goal, freedom of contract confines courts to their judicial function and dictates that they should not rewrite contracts to make them
more equitable308 or reallocate the rights and obligations the parties have accepted under their agreement.309 This judicial self-restraint is so strong and the
public interest in contract enforcement is so important310 that “[t]he fairness or
unfairness, folly or wisdom, or inequality of contracts are questions exclusively
within the rights of the parties to adjust at the time the contract is made.”311
Freedom of contract also has a societal impact as it promotes “[t]he necessary certainty, stability and integrity of contractual rights and obligations.”312
On the one hand, the public interest demands that “individuals have broad powers to order their own affairs by making legally enforceable promises.”313 Liberty of contract allows both buyers and sellers to benefit from a productive
commercial environment.314 To the same end, the law encourages parties to
304. See e.g., Balt. & Ohio Southwestern Ry. v. Voigt, 176 U.S. 498, 505–06
(1900); see also, First Ala. Bank of Montgomery v. First State Ins. Co., 899 F.2d 1045,
1085–86 (11th Cir. 1990); Baugh v. Novak, 340 S.W.3d 372, 382 (Tenn. 2011).
305. Autonomy, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
306. Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 100 (Tenn. 1999).
307. Id.
308. See Morta v. Korea Ins., 840 F.2d 1452, 1460 (9th Cir. 1988); Westmoreland
v. High Point Healthcare Inc., 721 S.E.2d 712, 722–23 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012); see also
CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACTS AS PROMISE 113 (1981) (“If we take autonomy seriously
as a principle for ordering human affairs . . . people must abide by the consequences of
their choices . . . .”).
309. See Marriott Corp. v. Dasta Constr. Co., 26 F.3d 1057, 1068 (11th Cir. 1994)
(internal citations omitted).
310. El Paso Field Servs., L.P. v. MasTec N. Am., Inc., 389 S.W.3d 802, 811–12
(Tex. 2012).
311. Barnes v. Helfenbein, 548 P.2d 1014, 1021 (Okla. 1976).
312. McCall v. Carlson, 172 P.2d 171, 187–88 (Nev. 1946).
313. Kona Vill. Realty, Inc. v. Sunstone Realty Partners, XIV, 236 P.3d 456, 458
(Haw. 2010) (quoting City Express, Inc. v. Express Partners, 959 P.2d 836, 840 n.4
(Haw. 1998)).
314. Id.
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maximize their personal objectives – “striving for that advantage is the source
of much economic progress.”315 On the other hand, “the freedom to contract
is not unlimited and . . . contracts that are contrary to public policy will not be
enforced.”316
The upshot is that “hard bargaining is not only acceptable, but indeed,
desirable, in our economic system, and should not be discouraged by the
courts.”317 The ordinary consumer has no special immunity from the consequences of his or her choices.318 Accordingly, a fundamental principle of contract law is “[w]ise or not, a deal is a deal.”319

B. Freedom of Contract and Boilerplate
With respect to boilerplate, the Michigan Supreme Court, in a wide-ranging analysis of the issues, has been emphatic that freedom of contract is fully
available with adhesion contracts.320 In considering an insurance policy – a
ubiquitous adhesion contract321 – the Michigan high court observed: “When a
court abrogates unambiguous contractual provisions based on its own inde-

315. Indust. Representatives, Inc. v. CP Clare Corp., 74 F.3d 128, 131–32 (7th
Cir.1996); see also Grace M. Giesel, A Realistic Proposal for the Contract Duress Doctrine, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 443, 466 (2005) (“A long held assumption about market
behavior is that optimal results on the whole obtain when each individual actor in the
market chooses the best option for that individual.”).
316. Lewis v. Giordano's Enterprises, Inc., 921 N.E.2d 740, 753 (Ill. Ct. App.
2009); see also DeVetter v. Principal Mut. Life Ins., 516 N.W.2d 792, 794 (Iowa 1994)
(“For a court to strike down a contract on [public policy] grounds, it must conclude that
the preservation of the general public welfare imperatively . . . demands invalidation so
as to outweigh the weighty societal interest in the freedom of contract.”).
317. 28 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §
71:7 (4th ed. 2003); see also Cabot Corp. v. AVX Corp., 863 N.E.2d 503, 512 (Mass.
2007) (“Absent any legally cognizable restraint,” both parties remain “free to drive
whatever bargain the market [will] bear.”).
318. Honorable v. Easy Life Real Estate Sys., 100 F. Supp. 2d 885, 888 (N.D. Ill.
2000) (“Courts have been reluctant to assume consumers are too ignorant and benighted
to fend for themselves merely because they are poor.”).
319. United Food & Com. Workers Union v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 806 F.2d 1385,
1386 (9th Cir. 1986).
320. Rory v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 35 (Mich. 2005); see also Morris R.
Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 563, 588 (1932) (extensive statement
of the “all important” role standardization plays in safeguarding freedom of contract).
321. See e.g., Max True Plastering Co. v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 912 P.2d 861,
864 (Okla. 1996) (“Insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion because of the uneven
bargaining positions of the parties.”).
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pendent assessment of ‘reasonableness,’ the court undermines the parties' freedom of contract.”322 Thus, Michigan and other jurisdictions see no contradiction between adhesion contracts and the freedom of contract.323 Similarly,
courts should construe standard form contracts and individually negotiated
contracts under the same general principles.324
Kar and Radin did not address these perspectives. Even where the contracting parties have manifested their assent to standardized adhesion clauses,
Kar and Radin created what amounts to a public policy defense against the
enforcement of boilerplate in the guise that these terms are outside the parties’
actual agreement.325 Even assuming that consumers in this situation are making a poor choice, a Florida District Court of Appeals decision explained: “People should be entitled to contract on their own terms without the indulgence of
paternalism by courts [or commentators] in the alleviation of one side or another from the effects of a bad bargain.” 326 Put another way, the consumer has
the right to make up his own mind about the risks and benefits of a contract
notwithstanding the opinions of outside persons who believe that a non-negotiable contract with captive prospective buyers is the sheerest of follies.327
Finally, in keeping with their consistent tilt in favor of consumers, Kar
and Radin offered little, if any, discussion of the merchant’s right of freedom
of contract in boilerplate. For the authors, the merchant’s freedom of contract
in this area need go only so far as complying with what the buyer determines
to be the boundaries of the actual agreement.328 This theme is apparent from

322. See Rory, 703 N.W.2d at 33.
323. See also Bailey v. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 255 P.3d 1039, 1047 (Colo. 2011)
(“The freedom to contract is especially important in the insurance industry, as insurance
policy terms are the primary means by which parties distribute and shift risk.”); Forecast Homes, Inc. v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 200, 213 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
2010).
324. See Rory, 703 N.W.2d at 31, 35, 42 (standard form contracts are contracts subject to traditional principles of contract interpretation).
325. See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1202.
326. Fotomat Corp. of Fla. v. Chanda, 464 So. 2d 626, 630 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1985); see also Honorable v. Easy Life Real Estate Sys., 100 F. Supp. 2d 885, 888
(N.D. Ill. 2000) (“Courts have been reluctant to assume consumers are too ignorant and
benighted to fend for themselves merely because they are poor.”); Johnson v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 272 N.W.2d 870, 875–76 (Iowa 1978) (Reynoldson, C.J., concurring)
(“A jurist's personal disdain for any particular clause is wholly irrelevant if the contracting parties have agreed to include it in their contract.”).
327. See Guiliano v. Cleo, Inc., 995 S.W.2d 88, 100 (Tenn. 1999) (“Generally, the
parties to a contract are free to agree upon . . . terms that may not seem desirable or
pleasant to outside observers”).
328. See Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1179 (“[parties] cannot create a common
meaning of the parties without actually creating that common meaning.”).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol84/iss3/7

54

Feldman: Actual Agreement, Shared Meaning Analysis, and the Invalidation o

2019]

BOILERPLATE INVALIDATION

765

Kar and Radin’s claim that shared meaning analysis purportedly does not “regulate parties’ actual agreements for fairness or on any other ground.”329 However, the above statement lacks support because the authors’ primary reason
for shared meaning analysis is, in fact, to regulate the market by preventing
what they considered to be exploitation of consumers.330 While there will always be the potential for merchant abuses of consumers, just as there will always be the potential for consumer abuses of corporations,331 the authors got
too close to – and perhaps went over – the line of denying businesses their valid
rights in boilerplate merely because such recognition could impair consumer
bargaining power.
Without empirical support, the authors subscribed to a normative ideal
that markets function better when consumers and merchants bargain as free and
equal parties, thereby leading to a favorable bargain for each side.332 Kar and
Radin further believed that it is feasible and desirable to level out merchant
advantages through shared meaning analysis.333 Thus, the authors would significantly restrain the merchant’s freedom of contract with no guidance over
what constitutes the seller’s “most essential” terms. Implicitly, these terms are
“few” in number, and their purpose is to avoid “battles” between the parties,
all subject to the consumer’s satisfaction.334 Given the subjective nature of
shared meaning analysis, established above, this proposal further shows Kar
and Radin’s slanted definition of freedom of contract.

VII. A PARTY’S DUTY TO READ AND UNDERSTAND CONTRACTS
Boilerplate contracts are known for the reality that consumers generally
do not read these agreements in any depth before signing them.335 Where a
consumer signs such a form contract without reading or understanding it, some
329. Id.
330. Id. Kar and Radin argue that assimilationist approaches improperly invite
new and expanding forms of market deception. According to the authors: “[M]arket
forces have begun to interact with assimilationist legal doctrine to create powerful incentives for businesses systematically to mislead consumers through what is sometimes
called careful contract design.” Id. at 1196.
331. See Katie Reilly, Shoplifting and Other Fraud Cost Retailers Nearly $50 Billion Last Year, MONEY.COM (June 22, 2017), http://time.com/money/4829684/shoplifting-fraud-retail-survey/ [perma.cc/95RD-3VF6] (loss of inventory from shoplifting
alone cost the U.S. retail industry approximately $18 billion in 2016).
332. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1161 (stating the premises of the American market economy as focusing on “parties with equal capacities to define and enter into only
those terms that both agree offer expected gains for each”).
333. Id.
334. Id. at 1179.
335. David v. M.L.G. Corp., 712 P.2d 985, 992 (Colo. 1986) (“It is common
knowledge that the detailed provisions of standardized contracts are seldom read by
consumers.”).
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contemporary courts continue to cite nineteenth century precedents that “[i]t
will not do for a man to enter a contract, and, when called upon to respond
to its obligations, to say he did not read it when he signed it, or did not
know what it contained.”336 This principle subsequently became known as the
“duty to read” doctrine337 – better stated as the duty to read and understand the
contract because merely reading the contract is no defense to liability.338 Absent an invalidating cause for modifying or overturning an agreement a party
has a broad duty “to read its contract and to learn its contents before signing
it.”339 This “duty to read” is a “basic tenet of contract law”340 and is closely
aligned with the plain meaning rule.341 The main consequence will be that
absent the other side's fraud, misrepresentation, or similar misbehavior, a party
to a contract is legally bound by its terms whether or not she has actually read
or understood them.342
336. Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50 (1875). For a sampling of decisions
relying on Upton, see K–Con Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. United States, 131 Fed. Cl. 275, 318
(Fed. Cl. 2017); Bell v. Land Title Guarantee Co., 422 P.3d 613, 616 (Colo. Ct. App.
2018); ABM Farms, Inc. v. Woods, 692 N.E.2d 574, 579 (Ohio 1998); cf. Clayton
P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts As An Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 680
(explaining why consumers can be “perfectly rational” not to read or understand
the terms, “[e]specially given the inability to negotiate around terms, if the buyer
accurately predicts that the costs of review exceeds its benefits”); Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 243
(1995).
337. John D. Calamari, Duty to Read – A Changing Concept, 43 FORDHAM L. REV.
341, 341 n.4 (1974) (a party generally owes this so-called duty to himself as opposed
to a third party); see also Charles L. Knapp, Is There a “Duty to Read”?, 66 HASTINGS
L.J. 1083, 1085–86 (2015) (“A person signing an agreement has a duty to read it and,
absent a showing of fraud, if the person is capable of reading and understanding the
contract then he is charged with the knowledge of what the contract says . . . He cannot
avoid the consequences of what he signed by simply saying that he did not know what
he signed.”).
338. See, e.g., Dasz, Inc. v. Meritocracy Ventures, Ltd., 969 N.Y.S.2d 653, 655
(N.Y. App. Div. 2013) (stating a “duty to read and understand” the agreement).
339. Burwell v. S.C. Nat'l Bank, 340 S.E.2d 786, 789 (S.C. 1986); see also Roberts
v. Roberts, 618 S.E.2d 761, 764 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005).
340. Woodruff v. Bretz, Inc., 218 P.3d 486, 495 (Mont. 2009) (internal citations
omitted).
341. See Kaiser Aluminum Corp., Inc., No. 02-10429, 2004 WL 97658, at *3
(Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 16, 2004).
342. The authors rely upon Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 211(3),
which closely resembles shared meaning analysis. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1202.
The Restatement provides that regarding unread or misunderstood boilerplate, “Where
the other party has reason to believe that the party manifesting such assent would not
do so if he knew that the writing contained a particular term, the term is not part of the
agreement.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
Most commentators have concluded that Section 211 has been a failure because it contradicts the objective theory of mutual assent. See, e.g., Zacks, supra note 299, at 747–
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Other rationales for the duty are: the ignorant party is estopped from raising the defense of the lack of consent to unread terms;343 the party is bound by
a conclusive presumption of knowledge of the terms;344 the uninformed signatory is held to the terms because he was negligent or assumed the risk of unfavorable terms;345 or the promisee failed unjustifiably to protect his or her own
interests.346 In fact, a party’s testimony or other evidence to prove his prior
uncommunicated subjective understanding of his contract is inadmissible.347
Kar and Radin did not delve into the doctrinal basis for the duty to read
or the sound policies it advances. Instead, the authors argued that the increased
complexity and length of modern contracts makes the duty to read an unfair,
impracticable relic.348 The only circumstances that they said would justify invocation of this principle is for text that has been “cooperatively communicated, i.e., the parties specifically agreed to the wording”349
Kar and Radin further criticized this line of authority by complaining that
when a merchant delivers copious boilerplate to consumers during the formation stage of contracting, “[i]t is typically the business that is behaving
badly by violating the cooperative norms of language use – not the consumer
who cannot but fail to read all this copious boilerplate text and live a normal
life.”350 Respectfully, this passage is hyperbole – the authors strained credulity
as they inferred a merchant’s lack of good faith and fair dealing based largely
on the proposed contractual page count. In many sectors of the economy,
lengthy contracts are necessary given the complexity of the subject matter, an
example would be a contract for the sale of a residence. Moreover, given the
48; Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contracting in the Age of the Internet of Things: Article 2 of the
UCC and Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 899–901 (2016). Kar and Radin say that
the commentators are only “partially right” insofar as assimilationist courts fail to embrace shared meaning analysis. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1202–03.
343. Knapp, supra note 337, at 1086.
344. Barnes, supra note 223, at 250–51.
345. Calamari, supra note 337, at 341.
346. Allied Office Supplies Inc. v. Lewandowski, 261 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112–13 (D.
Conn. 2003).
347. Apeldyn Corp. v. Eidos, LLC, 943 F. Supp. 2d. 1145, 1149 (D. Or. 2013)
(“Statements of a party’s subjective intent that were not expressed or communicated
when the contract was formed are not permissible evidence of intent.”).
348. Kar & Radin, supra note 4, at 1181.
349. Id.
350. Id. By making the point that consumers lack the time to read copious boilerplate, the authors’ argument contains a questionable implicit premise, namely, consumers would benefit if the law required merchants to give the consumer a more substantial
opportunity to read and understand boilerplate. Id. at 1140. This conclusion is dubious.
Greater disclosure requirements are “useless” because they would not produce more
consumer readership of contracts or more robust mutual assent in contract formation.
Omri Ben Shahar, The Myth of the Opportunity to Read in Contract Law, 5 EUR. REV.
CONT. L. 1, 6, 20 (2009) (stating “there is some evidence that the availability of terms
in advance of the purchase does nothing to improve their content”).
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time and expense companies devote to the preparation of standardized forms
that must address the company’s entire customer base, it is counter-intuitive to
contend that companies “typically” desire to harass their customers.
The duty to read and understand a contract rests on sound legal and economic policies. As shown above, the authors’ rejection of the fundamental
premise that the law holds a party responsible for reading and understanding
its contract would impair the party’s exercise of autonomy, thereby undermining the stability and predictability of contracts.351 Absent enforcement of the
purchaser’s duty to read and understand the agreement, merchants would lack
confidence in the commercial system.352 The seller’s fear would be that the
purchaser could too easily complain that he had not read or understood the fine
print in the contract; this argument would effectively stymie commercial activity in the marketplace.353 Because a consumer would evidence such a contention largely or even solely on his subjective intent, no reliable method exists to
sort out meritorious claims that a consumer failed to understand the terms.354
Additional legal principles support the duty to read and understand the
contract. For example, the New Mexico Supreme Court in Morstad v.
Atchison, T. & S. F. Railway Co. reasoned that, absent fraud or similar invalidating cause, the contract signatory “owes it to the other party to read or have
read, the contract . . . because the other party has a right to and does conform
his own conduct to the requirements of the contract . . . .”355 Another supporting principle is that the duty to read and understand the terms preserves fairness
to merchants because the law should preclude consumers from accepting the
benefits under the contract while selectively denying the existence of disliked
provisions.356
Lastly, the “[d]uty to read rule derives from the objective theory of contract.”357 The consequences of the “duty to read” doctrine are consistent with
351. Kar and Radin’s attack on the cases following the duty to read and the consequences to the consumer fails to account for the numerous exceptions to the doctrine in
addition to fraud or mistake. The leading contracts treatise mentions the various causes
in this category, for example, the print is too fine to be legible or is so cramped to be
unreadable. 2 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §
6:47 (4th ed. 2018).
352. See Barnes, supra note 223, at 237–38.
353. ABC Farms, Inc. v. Woods, 692 N.E.2d 574, 579 (Ohio 1998) (quoting Upton
v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45, 50 (1875)).
354. See supra Part III.C.
355. Morstad v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co., 170 P. 886, 889 (N.M. 1918).
356. See Colony Ins. Co. v. Jack A. Halprin, Inc., No. 3:10-CV-1059, 2012 WL
2859085, at *10 (D. Conn. July 11, 2012) (stating that not enforcing the duty to read
would make attempts to enter into contracts “futile”); Graham v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. 565 A.2d 908, 911 (Del. 1989) (“adhesive nature of a contract does not allow
the non-drafting party to reject contract terms that he later finds unappealing”).
357. Allied Office Supplies, Inc. v. Lewandowski, 261 F. Supp. 2d 107, 112 (D.
Conn. 2003).
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the autonomy strand of freedom to contract.358 Professors Robert E. Scott and
Jody S. Kraus commented,
The duty to read doctrine provides individuals with an incentive not to
sign agreements unless they have read and understood them first. In this
sense, it increases the likelihood that enforceable agreements will be
informed and thus serve the value of autonomy. By increasing the likelihood that agreements are mutually informed, this rule would also increase the probability that agreements enhance social welfare (i.e., the
consumer will be better off economically.).359

Based on Scott and Kraus's observation, the law preserves the purchaser’s
right of autonomy while advancing society's – and the merchant’s – interest in
the enforcement of valid contracts.360

VIII. PRECEDENTS CHALLENGING THE USE OF BOILERPLATE
Cases from various American jurisdictions comport with several themes
in Kar and Radin’s article. After summarizing the cases espousing the minority
view, I will show why the majority view more faithfully supports the essential
nature of contract.

A. Freedom of Contract
A surprising number of decisions or judicial observations directly support
Kar and Radin’s argument that standard form agreements can impair the consumer's freedom of contract under the autonomy principle.
A judge on the Illinois Court of Appeals once said, “Freedom of contract
simply does not exist” where the merchant draws up the terms and the consumer who “merely ‘adheres' to it has little choice as to its terms.”361 Another
case observed that the “marketplace reality” suggests that freedom of contract
in the sale of goods under an adhesion contract is actually “nonexistent.”362
Other courts stated that the consumer in this circumstance has little freedom of

358. Steven W. Feldman, Mutual Assent, Normative Degradation, and Mass Market Standard Form Contracts–A Two-Part Critique of Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights and the Rule of Law (Part I), 62 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 373, 408 (2014).
359. ROBERT E. SCOTT & JODY S. KRAUS, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 436 (4th
ed. 2007).
360. Wayne R Barnes, Consumer Assent to Standard Form Contracts and the Voting Analogy, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 839, 865 (2010).
361. Tibbs v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 373 N.E.2d 492, 498 (Ill. Ct. App. 1978) (Moran,
J., dissenting) (quoting Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy,
33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 22 (1920)).
362. Cate v. Dover Corp., 790 S.W.2d 559, 565 (Tex. 1990).
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contract with no ability to look elsewhere for a more favorable contract.363 In
sum, a number of courts rule that free choice is lacking where (a) the play of
the market does not bring the parties together, (b) the parties do not meet each
other on an approximately equal economic footing, and (c) the two sides do not
enter their contract as the result of free bargaining.364
Furthermore, Kar and Radin could have pointed out that the consumer's
frequently weaker bargaining position has prompted some jurisdictions to institute a stricter level of judicial review and policing of an adhesion contract to
help preserve freedom of contract.365 These decisions would have bolstered
the authors’ argument that freedom of contract is largely a mirage for consumers given that merchants can be tempted to go over – and sometimes will go
over – the line of fair bargaining. Therefore, true freedom of contract – from
the authors’ standpoint – is lacking in such a one-sided environment.

B. Cases Contesting Mutual Assent
A second line of cases uses a different mode of analysis from those decisions emphasizing the objective theory of contract, the plain meaning rule, the
duty to read, and the existence of consumer assent for adhesion contracts. Various decisions pre-dating Kar and Radin’s article shared their concerns that adhesion contracts do not fit the traditional model of offer and acceptance in a
bargained-for exchange.
For example, the Tennessee Court of Appeals follows a unique theory of
assent where one party signs a standard form contract furnished by the other
party.366 In this “circle of assent” doctrine, a party that signs such a document
will be bound by the provisions in the form over which the parties actually
bargained and by such other terms that are not unreasonable in view of the
circumstances surrounding the transaction.367
363. Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178, 1186 (Cal. 1976).
364. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 86 (N.J. 1960); Price v.
Gatlin, 405 P.2d 502, 507 (Or. 1965) (en banc); Gautreau v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins.
Co., 410 So. 2d 815, 818–19 (La. Ct. App. 1982), rev'd on other grounds, 429 So. 2d
866 (La. 1983); Pickering v. Am. Emp'rs Ins. Co., 282 A.2d 584, 593 (R.I. 1971) (stating that there is a higher burden to declare forfeiture of consumer rights); Perkins v.
Standard Oil Co., 383 P.2d 107, 112–13 (Or. 1963) (stating adhesion contracts should
be “construed with an awareness of the inequality of the bargainers”). For other decisions disassociating freedom of contract and adhesion contracts, see Feldman, supra
note 358, at 436 n.379.
365. Medovoi v. Am. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 152 Cal. Rptr. 572, 584 n.2 (Cal. Dist.
Ct. App. 1979) (Thompson, J., concurring) (limiting adhesion contracts to those “necessary to preserve freedom of contract in fact”).
366. See Bd. of Dirs. of Harriman Sch. Dist. v. Sw. Petroleum Corp., 757 S.W.2d
669, 675 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1988).
367. Id. at 674; Parton v. Mark Pirtle Oldsmobile–Cadillac–Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d
634, 637–38 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987), overruled by Copeland v. Healthsouth/Methodist
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Striking parallels exist between the Tennessee circle of assent doctrine
and shared meaning analysis. Both concepts allow subjective assent, i.e., “apparent and genuine assent.”368 Both standards mandate that merchants make
extensive disclosures to consumers.369 Both standards show hostility to boilerplate terms.370 Both doctrines oppose what they see as the imposition of abnormal risks upon consumers.371 Lastly, both formulations allow judges to rewrite the contract by the deletion of boilerplate if it fails to meet the above
requisites.372
Other decisions reveal concerns about the use of standardized contract
forms. In a representative 1981 Missouri Court of Appeals case, the court observed:
Our law distinguishes . . . between a contract consented to by negotiation and a contract assented to by adherence. The one (at least, as paradigm) describes a bargain between equals; the other, a form with standard terms imposed upon the applicant to take or leave . . . In an adhesion
contract . . . the assent is resembled rather than actual. The printed
words are not enough to disclose the expectations of the parties. The
court must look for that purpose to the full circumstances of the transaction whether the written words of the contract be ambiguous or unambiguous.
Interestingly, whether the consent arises through adherence or negotiation, Missouri courts apply the same rules of contract construction that
will implement as much as possible the “expectations which induced
[the] agreement.”373

Rehab. Hosp., 565 S.W.3d 260, 274 (Tenn. 2018); see generally Robert M. Lloyd, The
“Circle of Assent” Doctrine: An Important Innovation in Contract Law, 7
TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 237, 270 (2006) (explaining in-depth the rationale for
the rule).
368. Sw. Petroleum Corp., 757 S.W.2d at 674 (quoting Parton v. Mark Pirtle
Oldsmobile–Cadillac–Isuzu, Inc., 730 S.W.2d 634, 637 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987).
369. See, e.g., Lloyd, supra note 367 (explaining generally the rationale for the
rule).
370. Id. at 240.
371. Id.
372. Sw. Petroleum Corp., 757 S.W.2d at 674.
373. Spychalski v. MFA Life Ins. Co., 620 S.W.2d 388, 392–93 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981); see also Estrin Constr. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 612 S.W.2d 413, 422 (Mo.
Ct. App.1981) (“These [adhesive] terms are not the result of formal assent but are imposed. The other party does not agree to the transaction, but only adheres from want of
genuine choice.”).
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Still, other decisions hold that adhesion contracts are not agreements under the traditional bargain model. Regarding adhesion contracts, the prerequisites for “[a]ssent and volition . . . are absent.”374 Another case observed that
standard form adhesion contracts “are not, under any reasonable test, the agreement of the consumer or business recipient to whom they are delivered.”375 Yet
another decision concluded, “The contracting still imagined by courts and law
teachers as typical, in which both parties participate in choosing the language
of their entire agreement, is no longer of much more than historical importance.”376 A fourth case even implicitly rejected the plain meaning rule,
observing that “[a] court should disregard [the parties'] stated intent when it is
contained in an adhesion contract.”377 These courts would seem to agree that
“[t]he process of entering into a contract of adhesion . . . is not one of haggle
or cooperative process but rather of a fly and flypaper.”378
This other line of cases echoes Kar and Radin's refrain that contract law
has lost sight of the moral premise that contracts are enforceable only when
each side has voluntarily exchanged one item of value for another.379 Indeed,
an Arizona case observed in language very close to Kar and Radin's critique:
“To apply the old rule and interpret such contracts according to the imagined
intent of the parties is to perpetuate a fiction which can do no more than bring
the law into ridicule.”380 These cases indicate that an adhesion contract is not
a sufficiently pure form of private ordering.
Kar and Radin failed to mention that an influential tribunal has seemingly
narrowed the ambit of the objective theory regarding the existence of manifested intent.381 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
said in Williams v. First Government Mortgage and Investors Corp.:
374. Germantown Mfg. Co. v. Rawlinson, 491 A.2d 138, 147 (Pa. Super. 1985);
see also Brokers Title Co., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 610 F.2d 1174, 1180
(3d Cir. 1979) (“essence of assent is absent [in a contract of adhesion]”).
375. Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm’n, 605 A.2d 681, 686 (N.J.
1992) (quoting W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control
of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971)).
376. C & J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 173 (Iowa 1975)
(quoting W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 530 (1971)).
377. Taylor v. E. Connection Operating, Inc., 988 N.E.2d 408, 411 n.8 (Mass. 2013)
(quoting L.L. MCDOUGAL, III & R.U. WHITTEN, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 137 (5th
ed. 2001)).
378. Woodruff v. Bretz, Inc., 218 P.3d 486, 490 (Mont. 2009) (quoting ARTHUR
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1.4, 13–14 (rev. ed. 1998)).
379. Kar and Radin, supra note 4, at 1161 (stating each party has an obligation to
ensure that the other party is making a sound bargain).
380. Darner Motor Sales, Inc. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 682 P.2d 388,
399 (Ariz. 1984).
381. See Williams v. First Gov’t Mortg. & Investors Corp., 225 F.3d 738, 748 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449
(D.C. Cir. 1965)).
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[w]hen a party of little bargaining power, and hence little real choice,
signs a commercially unreasonable contract with little or no knowledge
of its terms, it is hardly likely that his consent, or even an objective
manifestation of his consent, was ever given to all the terms. 382

Put another way, the court indicated that a reasonable party in the position
of the seller, knowing that consumers rarely if ever read and understand the
particular mass market contract of adhesion, would not necessarily construe the
consumer's acceptance of the contract as manifesting concurrence.383 The traditional run of cases rarely, if ever, attempted to rebut this argument.
Although generally a pro-merchant policy, one iteration of the duty to
read doctrine384 comports with Kar and Radin's position. In contesting the use
of the objective theory of assent for boilerplate, the authors could have profitably cited those decisions that lessen the duty to read either when the party
signs an adhesion contract385 or when enforcing the duty to read would be “unfair under the circumstance” or cause “great hardship.”386 These courts further
reason in an exception to the duty to read that “[w]here a contractual provision
would defeat the ‘strong’ expectation of the weaker party, it may also be necessary [for the merchant] to call [the consumer's] attention to the language of
the provision.”387 Indeed, under New Jersey case law, an insurer must disclose
to the insured those policy terms that might vary from the insured's reasonable
expectations.388 Thus, Kar and Radin overlooked that some jurisdictions would
lessen the importance of the duty to read as a barrier for consumers seeking to
overturn their standardized adhesion contracts.
Apart from these qualifications to the duty to read, even when the contract
terms are unambiguous, Kar and Radin could have argued that a strict approach

382. Id.; see also Klos v. Lotnicze, 133 F.3d 164, 168 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The concept
of adhesion contracts introduces the serpent of uncertainty into the Eden of contract
enforcement. At the very least, it represents a serious challenge to orthodox contract
law that a contract is to be interpreted in accordance with the objective manifestation
of the parties' intent.”).
383. Williams, 225 F.3d at 748.
384. See Merit Music Serv., Inc. v. Sonneborn, 225 A.2d 470, 474 (Md. 1967) (“the
law presumes that a person knows the contents of a document that he executes and
understands at least the literal meaning of its terms”).
385. Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775, 785 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1976); see also Rempel v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 370 A.2d 366, 369 (Pa. 1977)
(given the adhesive nature of an insurance policy the insured is under no duty to read
the document).
386. Heller Fin., Inc. v. Hidwhey Powder Co., Inc., 883 F.2d 1286, 1292 (7th Cir.
1989) (internal citations omitted).
387. Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
388. Bowler v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 250 A.2d 580, 588 (N.J. 1969).
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marginalizes the importance of the circumstances surrounding contract formation and performance.389 The last-cited decisions indicated that they will
not apply the rules of contract construction in an “unreal” – or even “fictitious”
– manner.390 This broader view of contract-as-transaction could support the
position that, irrespective of dry words on inert paper, the particular parties in
the full context of their living relationship never intended anything other than
a free and open transaction. Authority also exists for the proposition that the
duty to read merely states a rebuttable presumption that cannot stand where
dispelled by direct evidence that the person never read the document in question.391
Ultimately, the legal and policy argument can be made that, notwithstanding the objective theory, when a court finds that a party has ignorantly signed
a contract and the other party knows it or has reason to know it, then enforcement of such a contract undermines reliance on the stability of commercial
transactions. As stated by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals,
The [problem is that the] written term asserted by one party is contained
in a form contract, in circumstances where the party asserting the term
has no reasonable basis to believe that the other party had knowingly or
would knowingly assent to the term. In such circumstances, enforcement of the written term does not further the policies underlying contract law, [which are] to “promot[e] and facilitat[e] reliance on business
agreements.”392

C. Explaining Mutual Assent when Actual Agreement is Missing
If various courts under the second line of authority accept that full-fledged
agreement is missing for adhesion contracts, how do these decisions rationalize
the absence of traditional mutual assent? The possible obstacle here is that if
there is no evidence of mutual assent, then there is no contract and no agreement to enforce by either side.393 While Kar and Radin cited no case law either
way on this issue, several decisions address this problem.
389. A number of courts give these extrinsic considerations important weight. See,
e.g., Muchesko v. Muchesko, 955 P.2d 21, 24 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997) (in determining
mutual assent, courts may consider the language of the agreement, the parties' conduct
and other circumstances); Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 103 P.3d 773, 784 (Wash. 2004)
(en banc).
390. Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 118 (2d Cir. 1976) (internal citations omitted); but see Rory v. Cont'l Ins. Co., 703 N.W.2d 23, 35 (Mich.
2005) (applying plain meaning rule to adhesion contracts).
391. Wheeler, 133 Cal. Rptr. at 791.
392. Sutton v. Banner Life Ins. Co., 686 A.2d 1045, 1052 (D.C. App. 1996) (emphasis added).
393. See Rory, 703 N.W.2d at 42 n.84; see also Muchesko, 955 P.2d at 24 (mutual
assent is an essential element of any enforceable contract).
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Some cases indicated that consent is merely assumed because the consumer trusts to the good faith of the party using the form agreement and to the
tacit representation that like terms are being accepted regularly by other parties
similarly situated.”394 Citing the example of insurance policies, courts in another line of cases have conceded that mutual consent is missing for adhesion
contracts and that it is necessary to substitute the role of public expectations
and commercially-accepted standards for ordinary standards for assent.395 Still
other courts have asserted the merchant creates consent through de facto legislation. The argument here centers on the point that one predominant unilateral
will – the merchant's – in substance, legislates terms to an undetermined number of persons rather than to just one individual; accordingly, these adhesive
instruments are more akin to “[a] law rather than a meeting of the minds.”396
What can we make of the cases conceding the consumer does not give
sufficient assent but is bound nonetheless under consent-substitutes, such as
public expectations, commercially reasonable standards, or de facto legislation? Along these same lines another question may be asked: If a court rejects
the plain meaning rule and rejects consent substitutes such as de facto legislation, is there a theory that accurately reflects the realities of adhesion contracts
consistent with the traditional objective doctrine of assent?

D. Resolution of the Conflicting Decisions
As compared with the majority view supporting bona fide mutual assent
for adhesion contracts, the minority position challenging the existence of consent for these contracts is not persuasive. A Missouri Court of Appeals decision in the minority camp, Spychalski v. MFA Life Insurance Co.,397 erred by
stating that “quite apart” from the existence of any ambiguity, or the written
words of the contract, “[t]he printed words are not enough to disclose the expectations of the parties.”398 The more logical position is that when the boilerplate is sufficiently comprehensive, which is almost always the case, the
printed words and their plain meaning are generally adequate under the objective doctrine to establish mutual assent. In effect, the minority line of decisions
incorrectly requires proof of the consumer's subjective knowing assent.399 Accordingly, the minority position directly contradicts the established test, which
394. State ex rel. Dunlap v. Berger, 567 S.E.2d 265, 274 (W. Va. 2002) (quoting
Mitchell v. Broadnax, 537 S.E.2d 882, 898 (W. Va. 2000)) (Starcher, J., concurring).
395. Vargas v. Calabrese, 714 F. Supp. 714, 720 (D.N.J. 1989); see also Vasquez
v. Glassboro Serv. Ass'n, Inc., 415 A.2d 1156, 1165 (N.J. 1980).
396. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 86 (N.J. 1960) (citing
Siegelman v. Cunard White Star, 221 F.2d 189, 206 (2d Cir. 1955) (Frank, J., dissenting)); Dunlap, 567 S.E.2d at 273 n.4.
397. 620 S.W.2d 388, 393 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
398. Id. at 393–94.
399. For a specific example of this inappropriate subjectivist approach, see NAACP
of Camden Cty. E. v. Foulke Mgmt. Corp., 24 A.3d 777 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2019

65

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 84, Iss. 3 [2019], Art. 7

776

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

looks to “objective” manifestations of “voluntary mutual assent” through the
medium of the contract document in the context of “an offer and reciprocal
acceptance.”400
Furthermore, the minority position overlooks the prevailing rule: “The
only intent of the parties to a contract which is essential is an intent to say the
words and do the acts which constitute their manifestation of assent”; agreement does not “consist of harmonious intentions or states of mind . . . .”401
When the parties affix voluntary signatures on a document that is unambiguously presented to them and known to be a contract with no recognized defense
that upsets the legal existence of joint assent, no real question exists as to mutual assent.
This last argument draws support from the theory that adhesion contracts
with a knowing exchange of money for goods or services are contractual “bargains” under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.402 The Restatement defines a “bargain” as an “[a]greement to exchange promises or to exchange a
promise for a performance or to exchange performances.”403 In this respect, a
bargain is also commonly a contract where it provides “[a] remedy for its
breach or recognize performance as a legal duty.”404 Therefore, when a consumer pays for a service or product after signing what he understands to be a
contract, even if there is some form of economic pressure or if the consumer is
not fully conversant with all terms, it is difficult to contend under a flexible but
realistic view of the law that there is no “bargain” – and therefore no “contract”
– under the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.405
2011) (“Because arbitration provisions are often embedded in contracts of adhesion,
courts take particular care in assuring the knowing assent of both parties to arbitrate,
and a clear mutual understanding of the ramifications of that assent.” (emphasis
added)); see also Peoples Mortg. Co. v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 856 F. Supp. 910, 927
(E.D. Pa. 1994).
400. Anderson v. United States, 344 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS 18 (1981) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)). The
courts commonly apply the conventional objective test to insurance policies, which
courts have construed as a category of adhesion contracts. See, e.g., Harrington v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 54 So. 3d 999, 1002 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010); U.S. Fire Ins.
Co. v. Fleekop, 682 So. 2d 620, 627 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
401. Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 190 (D.C. Cir. 2009); see also
Moody Realty Co. v. Huestis, 237 S.W.3d 666, 674 n.8 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (“The
legal mechanism by which parties show their assent to be bound is through offer and
acceptance.”).
402. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
403. Id.
404. See Daniel P. O'Gorman, Redefining Offer in Contract Law, 82 MISS. L.J.
1049, 1054 (2013).
405. Sherman v. Lunsford, 723 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) (“Although
the parties may not have fully understood the legal significance of each and every term,
they knew they were signing a binding contract.”); Nw. Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Donovan, 916
F.2d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 1990) (“Form contracts, and standard clauses in individually
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Besides reflecting the legal tenets of the objective doctrine – including
the plain meaning rule and the duty to read and understand a contract – and
meeting the criteria of an enforceable bargain per the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts, the majority doctrine draws support from the strong policies of the
sanctity of contract and the need for preserving commercial stability.406 It also
implements the rule that, wherever possible, courts should strive to uphold,
rather than to defeat, an otherwise binding contract.407 As the decisions recognize,
In the overwhelming majority of circumstances, contractual promises
are to be performed, not avoided: pacta sunt servanda, or, as the Seventh
Circuit loosely translated it, “a deal's a deal.” This is an eminently
sound doctrine, because typically. . . [A] court cannot improve matters
by intervention after the fact. It can only destabilize the institution of
contract, increase risk, and make parties worse off. . . .408

Therefore, where the issue is in doubt, the majority position is sounder
than the minority rule because the prevailing test better promotes the fundamental values of the contracting system.

CONCLUSION
Because Pseudo-Contract and Shared Meaning Analysis is largely a doctrinal challenge to the courts and some analysts, a response is also appropriate
based largely on doctrinal grounds. Most prominently, the authors’ reliance on
linguistics has little value for contract interpretation, and the shared meaning

negotiated contracts, enable enormous savings in transaction costs, and the abuses to
which they occasionally give rise can be controlled without altering traditional doctrines, provided those doctrines are interpreted flexibly, realistically.”). If one were to
take literally Kar and Radin's argument that pseudo-contracts are not contracts, then
they would need to concede that the law should not recognize a remedy for a seller’s
breach. I doubt Kar and Radin would subscribe to leaving consumers in such a lurch.
406. See generally Morta v. Korea Ins. Corp., 840 F.2d 1452, 1460 (9th Cir. 1988)
(emphasizing policies underlying sanctity of contract as a “civilizing concept”); Universal Studios, Inc. v. Viacom, Inc., 705 A.2d 579, 589 (Del. Ch. 1997) (emphasizing
the “necessity of preserving predictability and stability in commercial transactions”).
407. See 11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
§ 32:11 (4th ed. 2019) (whenever possible courts strive to uphold a contract as to its
validity); cf. Atl. Marine Const. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for W. Dist. of Texas, 571 U.S.
49, 66 (2013) (“Because courts should not unnecessarily disrupt the parties’ [contractual agreement] . . . [i]n all but the most unusual cases . . . the interest of justice is served
by holding the parties to their bargain.”) (internal quotations omitted).
408. Specialty Tires of Am., Inc. v. CIT Group/Equip. Fin., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d
434, 437 (W.D. Pa. 2000) (citing Waukesha Foundry, Inc. v. Indus. Eng'g, Inc., 91 F.3d
1002, 1010 (7th Cir. 1996)).
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analysis proposal simply masks Kar and Radin’s dissatisfaction with the balance of market power as between merchants and consumers.
The authors’ proposal, if adopted, would likely detract from established
contractual theories of obligation, undermine some key evidentiary principles,
impair freedom of contract and the duty to read, and create the likelihood that
the American commercial system would experience widespread unpredictability and uncertainty. Unlike the authors, courts have regularly rejected the notion that boilerplate terms are per se unfair or contrary to public policy.409
Given that almost all courts regularly uphold standard form contracts absent a
recognized bargaining defect, “[r]ational personal and economic behavior in
the modern post-industrial world is only possible if agreements between parties
are respected.”410 Kar and Radin's article did not appropriately consider these
significant policies. Because the accurate recitation of legal principles must
support valid doctrinal and normative criticism of the contracting system and
especially considering that courts already follow numerous pro-consumer doctrines, Kar and Radin have failed to establish that current law undermines mutual assent.

409. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
410. Dearnley v. Mountain Creek, No. L–540–09, 2012 WL 762150, at *3 (N.J.
Super. Ct. A.D. Mar. 12, 2012) (per curiam).
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